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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION,
PUBLIC FUNDING, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
by STEVEN K. GREEN*
The Salvation Army runs one of the larger private social service
networks in the United States.' Operating in all fifty states and in
every American city with a significant population, the Army runs
homeless shelters and feeding programs, offers job training, and
maintains day care and alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs for
the millions of forgotten and faceless people living in poverty and
despair.2 Because of its long-standing commitment to assisting the
needy, its effective network of agencies and its efficient
organizational structure that runs like-well, an army-the Army has
long received federal, state and local funds that pay for many of its
human service programs.'
The Salvation Army is also a church.4 Founded in the 1870s by
British evangelist William Booth, the Army is a Protestant
evangelical denomination with roots in the Methodist sanctification
movement: The Army has a body of doctrine, a recognized clergy
*Associate Professor, Willamette University College of Law; counsel in Pedreira v.
Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
1. See JOHN MCCARTHY & JIM CASTELLI, RELIGION-SPONSORED SOCIAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE NOT-SO-INDEPENDENT SECTOR 27 (1997) (indicating that in

1995 The Salvation Army provided services for more than 27 million people through 20
different program areas).
2. Id.; see also the Salvation Army's web page at http://www.salvationarmyusa.org.
3.

CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-

BASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES 212-40 (2000). For example, in 1999, the
Salvation Army USA Western Territory received approximately $266,292.00 from various
government sources, amounting to 15.6% of its overall income of $1.7
million.http://www.salvationarmy.usawest.org/about-stats.html.
4. GLENN, supra note 4, at 212-40; FRANK S. MEAD, HANDBOOK OF
DENOMINATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES 230-32 (8th ed. 1987). See also McClure v. The
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1972).
5.

See RoY HATrERSEY, BLOOD AND FIRE: WILLIAM AND CATHERINE BOOTH
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(officers), and conducts worship services with an established liturgy.6

Like many evangelical bodies, the church espouses a post-millennial
eschatology that expects the immediate return of Jesus who will judge
the righteous and the unjust. Congregants believe in the sinfulness of
humankind and the unique redemptive power of Jesus Christ.

Salvation-and theoretically, sanctification-can occur only through
a conversion experience in which one accepts Jesus as his or her Lord
and Savior.7 Army members (soldiers) therefore believe that their

first priority is to preach the Gospel to the unsaved. As one
commentator has noted, for the Army, "its social services are merely
a means of putting the socially disinherited-the needy in both the
physical and spiritual realm-into a condition to be physically and
spiritually uplifted." 8 Based on its status as a church, the Army enjoys
the same legal benefits afforded other religious bodies, including
being exempt from paying state and federal taxes or adhering to
many of the regulations governing employment relationships.9

One of the more important regulations affecting employment
relationships is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its
equivalent state and local nondiscrimination laws.1"

Title VII

prohibits private employers with fifteen or more employees from
discriminating in their employment practices on the bases of race,
color, national origin, sex or religion." As Congress intended, and as
courts have universally found, Title VII applies to religious

organizations in the same way it applies to secular private
employers. 2 The law, however, exempts religious organizations from
AND THEIR SALVATION ARMY 7 (1999); MEAD,_supra note 5, at 230-31.

6. See http://www.salvationarmy.org/webmain.nsf/sub/whoweare; MEAD, supra note
5, at 231-32.
7. MEAD, supra note 5, at 230-32.
8. Id.
9. For example, the Salvation Army, like other religious bodies, is exempt from
paying social security taxes for its clergy or unemployment compensation for its
employees. In addition, courts have held that charitable operations of the Salvation Army
are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime compensation requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(b), 207(b) (1966). See Wagner v. Salvation Army,
660 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see also discussion infra notes 224-240.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because or such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.").
11. Id.
12. See 110 CONG. REC. 12818; Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986);
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complying with the prohibition on religious discrimination "with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities."" In
other words, this exemption, commonly known as section 702, entitles
religious organizations to discriminate on religious grounds when
hiring, promoting, or firing employees. The religious organization,
though, remains subject to the prohibitions on discriminating on the
basis of race, color, national origin and sex."
The religious exemption to Title VII has not always been so
broad. As addressed more fully below, Title VII originally exempted
religious organizations from its non-discrimination requirement only
with respect to positions that were connected with the organization's
religious activities, thus prohibiting employment decisions based on
religion when the employee performed secular duties within the
organization. 5 In 1972, Congress amended section 702 to expand the
zone of permissible religious discrimination to include all persons
employed by a religious organization, regardless of whether their
duties or functions contained a religious component.16 The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of that amendment in 1987.'"
Therefore, under Title VII, the Salvation Army is allowed to hire
co-religionists and discriminate on religious grounds in other
employment practices for all positions, including those within its
human service programs, regardless of whether the positions involve
religious or secular duties.
Despite the Supreme Court's
determination that this exemption is constitutionally permissible,18 the
E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E.O.C. v. Miss.
Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 487 (5th Cir. 1980); McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a).
14. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166; Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at
1276. See also Section-by-Section Analysis to the Conference Report on H.R. 1746, "The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972," in THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 128 (1973) ("[Religious corporations, associations,
educational institutions and societies] remain subject to the provisions of Title VII with
regard to race, color, sex, or national origin.").
15. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (exempting religious
organizations from Title VII only for persons employed to perform work "connected with
the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities)."
(emphasis added).
16. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
103-04 (1972).
17. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 339 (1987).
18.

Id.
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question remains whether it is constitutionally and politically
defensible in all contexts. A second, and generally unanswered
question is whether this license to discriminate on the basis of religion
does or should extend to human service positions that are funded in
whole or in part by public dollars, such as a registered dietician hired
to run an Army soup kitchen. Are the reputed constitutional values
that support the section 702 exemption-preservation of religious
autonomy, identity, and control over religious mission, to name a few
-present when the government initiates or defines the program goals
and functions, or when the employment decisions involve positions
that perform essentially secular functions and are funded by tax
dollars? If so, is the national commitment to ending discrimination in
the workplace sufficiently enhanced when government grants,
contracts, or vouchers are at stake, such that this public interest
should outweigh religious considerations, constitutional or
otherwise? 9 Additionally, does permitting religious discrimination in
positions or programs that are funded by the government constitute
state-sponsored discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause? Does it similarly result in religious favoritism and the
advancement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause?
Despite a healthy body of case-law interpreting the application
of Title VII and section 702 to religious organizations, these questions
have generally gone unaddressed.2 ° Most likely, the dearth of
litigation on this issue is due to the commitment of most established
religious agencies such as Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services
and religiously run hospitals and nursing facilities not to engage in
employment discrimination for most human service positions. No
doubt, at a time of shortage of health care workers, a religious test for
employment severely limits the available applicant pool. Also, until
recently, accepted Establishment Clause interpretations had
prohibited public funding of many religious endeavors, unless the
19. See E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) ("By
enacting Title VII, Congress clearly targeted the elimination of all forms of discrimination
at a "'highest priority."'); E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he
government has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in all forms.").
20. In the only case directly on point, Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S88-0353, 1989
WL 53857 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 9, 1989), a federal district court held section 702 violated the
Establishment Clause in circumstances where the Salvation Army fired an employee in a
government funded position for being a Wicca: "[The effect of the government
substantially, if not exclusively, funding a position such as the Victims' Assistance
Coordinator and then allowing the Salvation Army to choose the person to fill or maintain
the position based on religious preference clearly has the effect of advancing religion and
is unconstitutional." Id. at *3.The case is unreported.
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religious and secular components could be severed.2 ' This practice of
segregating profane from sacred functions-usually by establishing

separate legal entities-ensured that the government funded secular
services only. Opportunities for publicly funded indoctrination or
discrimination were therefore rare.

Questions about public funding of entities engaged in religious
discrimination have become more salient with the enactment of
"Charitable Choice" provisions in recent federal social service
legislation. First appearing in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996,
Charitable Choice requires states to allow religious organizations to

compete for government grants and contracts "on the same basis as
any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious
character of such [religious] organizations."2 The purpose of the law
is to ensure that religious organizations-both the more traditional
"religiously affiliated" agencies like Catholic Charities USA and
Lutheran Social Services and the more "faith infused" providers that
heretofore had not received government grants based on the
pervasively religious character of their polity or programs,23 popularly
called "faith-based organizations" (FBOs)-can receive public
monies to run religiously infused social programs while retaining their
religious identity and approach.
Charitable Choice, though, suffers from a degree of
schizophrenia. On the one hand, the law has the overarching purpose
of facilitating a religiously integrated alternative to funded human
services while it exempts FBOs from some restrictions applied to nonreligious providers.24 On the other hand, it also prohibits public funds
from being used for religious worship, instruction or proselytizing and

21. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-12 (1988) (reaffirming the prohibition
on public funding of "pervasive sectarian" institutions and enterprises). But see Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825-29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (questioning the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian institutions from neutral funding programs).
22. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2001). Charitable Choice language currently appears in two other laws,
the Community Services Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (2000), and in federal
substance abuse and mental health programs, 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 290kk290kk-2 (2000).
23. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609-10.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (allowing religious providers to discriminate in
employment practices); id. at § 604a(d) (affirming that FBOs retain "control over the
definition, development, practice and expression of [their] religious beliefs" and may
continue to display "religious art, icons, scripture, and other symbols" in places where they
deliver the funded services); id. at § 604a(h)(2) (allowing FBOs solely to limit government
audits by segregating public funds into separate accounts).
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prohibits religious organizations from refusing to serve eligible
beneficiaries on the basis of their religion or their refusal to "actively
participate in a religious practice."' These latter restrictions would
seem to undercut the effectiveness of a spiritually integrated
approach to human services, requiring FBOs to work with one hand
tied behind their backs. Yet, despite sending mixed signals about the
importance and role of faith in addressing social problems, the law's
undeniable purpose is to facilitate participation in funded programs

by organizations that offer religiously infused solutions to human
problems.26
This aspect of Charitable Choice should set off Establishment
Clause warning alarms, as that clause has traditionally been viewed as
prohibiting the funding of pervasively sectarian enterprises and

religiously infused programs.27 A slim Court majority still insists that
government funding of religious worship or indoctrination is
forbidden, even when it occurs pursuant to a religiously neutral

program made available to religious and nonreligious entities alike. 8
But judicial perspectives are changing, as is evident by the recent
decision upholding public vouchers for private religious schooling,29

and a majority of the justices apparently have no problem with the
government funding putative secular programs run by pervasively
sectarian organizations-if that is not an oxymoron-provided direct
funds do not pay for actual religious activity.' And, as noted, the
Charitable Choice foreswears government funding of religious
worship, instruction or proselytizing, as if those terms encompassed
the entire universe of potential religious expression and activity.3

25. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j).
26. See JULIE A. SEGAL, "'Holy Mistaken Zeal"': The Legislative History and Future
of CharitableChoice," in WELFARE REFORM AND FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS 9-27

(Derek Davis & Barry Hankins, eds, 1997).
27. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609-10. See also Freedom From Religion Found. v.
McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (holding unconstitutional direct state
funding of a religiously infused alcohol treatment program).
28. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 790, 837-38 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,concurring);
868-69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
30. See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2467; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10, 818-19 (plurality),84142 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. In an earlier holding, the Court declared that the First Amendment applies to
"any religious activit[y] or institution[], whatever [it] may be called, or whatever form [it]
may adopt to teach or practice religion." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Of course, even if the law's terms are defined broadly to exclude funding of other forms of
religious activity, religion clause concerns remain, particularly if a FBO integrates
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Problem solved.
The most significant feature of Charitable Choice-at least for
the purposes of this article-is the provision that expressly authorizes
religious providers to discriminate in employment with respect to
those positions funded under the law: "A religious organization's
exemption provided under section 2000e-1 of this title [section 702]
regarding employment practices shall not be affected by its
participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in
subsection (a)(2) of this section."33 As a result of this provision,
religious organizations may accept public money to fund their social
service programs but insist on hiring only co-religionists to work in
those same putatively secular programs.
The religious discrimination issue has risen to the forefront of the
Charitable Choice debate, spurred on by President George W. Bush's
"faith-based initiative" and recent attempts in Congress to apply
Charitable Choice provisions to all federal social service programs.'
While opponents of Charitable Choice initially emphasized the
Establishment Clause considerations of funding pervasively sectarian
organizations to provide a religiously oriented product, those
concerns never caught on in Congress, likely because the law's
prohibition on funding overt religious activity satisfied the concerns
of most legislators.35 The notion of not simply allowing but funding
discrimination is a different matter, and the issue has garnered more
attention and elicited greater opposition. Revelations of back-room
deals between the Bush Administration and Salvation Army lobbyists
to guarantee religious providers the ability to discriminate against gay
privately funded religious activity into the requirements of a program that is partially
funded by the government. FBOs may also encourage beneficiaries to participate
"voluntarily" in religious activity, setting up the appearance of a quid pro quo in order to
receive benefits. In related contexts, courts have held that the government may not coerce
beneficiaries or probationers to attend religiously oriented substance abuse programs.
DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2001); Warner v. Orange
County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir.
1996).
32. Charitable Choice also requires that its "programs must be implemented
consistent with the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution." 42 U.S.C. §
604a(c).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f)
34. See Laura B. Mutterperl, "Employment at (God's) Will: The Constitutionality of
AntidiscriminationExemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation," 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 389 (2002); Scott M. Michelman, "Faith-Based Initiatives," 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
475 (2002); Michelle Diabadj, "The Legal and Social Consequences of Faith-Based
Initiatives and CharitableChoice," 26 S.ILL. U. L.J. 529 (2002).
35. See SEGAL, supra note 26, at 16-20.
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and lesbian job applicants only intensified public scrutiny on this
issue. 36 The discrimination issue has so resonated that the coalition of
church-state and civil liberties organizations that has fought
Charitable Choice since 1995 renamed itself the Coalition to End
Religious Discrimination.37 Most legal scholars who have testified in
Congress on this issue, however, have insisted that the Constitution
permits, and may in fact support, religious organizations receiving
public funding for social programing without losing their section 702
exemption.38 The primary basis for such opinions of constitutionality
is that religious organizations are not state actors subject to the
strictures of the Equal Protection and Establishment clauses. 9
This Article offers a different approach to the issue of public
funding of religious discrimination. First, it considers the purposes
and goals of the religious exemption to Title VII's prohibition on
religious discrimination and how those interests overlay with the
constitutional values section 702 was designed to protect. Second, it
briefly examines how courts have interpreted section 702, with an eye
toward how such interpretations might apply in funding contexts.
Third, this Article analyzes the holding in Corporation of the
PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 4 the decision upholding the constitutionality of section 702, for
consistency with the constitutional values and the expedience of
extending that holding to publicly funded positions. The Article
concludes by arguing that an expanded application of section 702 to
government funded programs is inconsistent with general legislative
purposes and constitutional values supporting the exemption, and
that its availability for positions that are publicly funded violates the
Equal Protection and Establishment clauses.

36. See Dana Milbank,"Charity Cites Bush Help in Fight Against Hiring Gays,"

WASH. POST, July 10, 2001, at Al; Mike Allen & Dana Milbank,"Rove Heard Charity Plea
on Gay' Bias," WASH. Post, July 12, 2001, at Al.
37. See web page of Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
http://www.au.org.
38. See "ConstitutionalRole of Faith-BasedOrganizationsin Competitionsfor Federal
Social Service Funds," Hearing Before the House Subcom. on the Constitution, Comm. on

the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (June 7, 2001) (statements of Douglas Laycock, Ira C. Lupu,
and Carl H. Esbeck).
39. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.

830, 842 (1982); N.L.R.B. v. Kemmerer Vill., 907 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1990). See
discussion infra note 286.
40. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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The Religious Exemption to Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 as a cornerstone of its efforts
to eradicate suspect forms of discrimination in the public and private
spheres.4 Expressly prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion, it represents "an
expression of Congress' laudable intention to eliminate all forms of
unjustified discrimination in employment.

4

2

Unlike Title VI, which

prohibits discrimination in any program or activity funded by the
government, 43 Title VII does not rely on Congress' spending powers
for its authority over private actions and is thus triggered in the
absence of any public funding flowing to private employers.'
To determine the purposes and scope of the 702 exemption, it is
useful to consider its history, which is tortuous at best. From the
beginning, Title VII included a limited exemption for religious
employers. As originally proposed in 1964 by the House of
Representatives, section 702 gave religious organizations a blanket
exemption from all of Title VII's provisions.4 '

The Senate balked,

however, at allowing religious organizations to discriminate on the
basis of race, gender and national origin and, under the leadership of
Senator Hubert Humphrey, substituted an amendment that limited
the exemption for religious organizations to the "employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
the carrying [out]

...

of [that organization's] religious activities.""

Thus as originally enacted, section 702 allowed religious organizations
to engage in religious discrimination solely with respect to those
positions that had religious functions or duties.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume from the language of
either the original House proposal or the final version of section 702
41. See S. REP. No. 872, ""reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355 ("The purpose of S.
1732 is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial
and religious discrimination or segregation by establishments doing business with the
general public, and by labor unions and professional, business, and trade associations.").
42. Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 5309. The prohibition in Title VI applies to discrimination on the
basis of race, color or national origin, and is thus ineffective against religious
discrimination.
44. Rather, Title VII relies on Congress' Article I commerce powers, applying to
"employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... with fifteen or more
employees." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
45. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Civil Rights Act of 1964), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355,
2391, 2402 (hereinafter "Legislative History"); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
558 (5th Cir. 1972); E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
46. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556, n.4. See 110 CONG. REC. 12818 (emphasis supplied).
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that Congress carefully considered the need of religious organizations

to employ co-religionists. Congress' overarching purpose in enacting
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was to end racial discrimination in
accommodations and employment; the legislative history contains few
statements about ending religious discrimination and no discussion
about the need to accommodate religious autonomy interests by
allowing religious entities to discriminate on the basis of religion. 7 A

congressional rationale for section 702 simply is missing.
In 1971, Congress considered several amendments to Title VII,
spurred on by concerns about the lack of EEOC enforcement powers
and the exclusion of state and local government employers from the
Act's coverage. 48 Most important for the purposes of this article, the
final draft approved by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare

Committee dropped a free-standing exemption for educational
institutions while leaving the religious exemption unchanged. 9

The proposed expansion of Title VII was not without
controversy, as several southern senators-in particular, Senators
Sam Ervin of North Carolina and James Allen of Alabama-worked
assiduously to defeat the measure. Altogether, Senators Ervin and
Allen proposed thirteen amendments to the committee report, all of
which would have narrowed the scope of Title VII or affected the
EEOC's enforcement powers. ° As part of this effort, Ervin proposed

exempting religious

educational

institutions and organizations

entirely from the coverage of Title VII, as had been proposed and
ultimately rejected in the House in 1964."' The Senate rebuffed
47. See, e.g., Views of Reps. Carleton J. King, Arch A. Moore Jr., and William M.
McCulloch, et al., in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2428-31; 2487. The
extent of enforcement powers of the newly created E.E.O.C. also overshadowed other
matters.
48.

See THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, supra note 14, at 1.

49. The draft added religious educational institutions under section 702. See Senate
Labor Committee Report, id. at 258-69. This Article focuses on the 1971-72 Senate bill
because the House-passed version, H.R. 1746, left the original 702 exception with respect
to religious institutions intact, deleting only the exemption for educational institutions.
After the Senate amended section 702 to reflect its current language, the House acceded
to the Senate version in conference committee. Report of House Committee on
Education and Labor, id. at 155-224.
50. See 118 CONG. REC. at 1995; THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF

1972, supra note 15, at 410-12 (listing 13 proposed amendments by Ervin and Allen to
Senate Labor Committee Report to S. 2515).
51. See 118 CONG. REC. at 1981-82 ("Mr. Ervin: I would allow the religious
corporation to do what it pleased.... [The amendment] would take it out from under the
control of the E.E.O.C. entirely."); Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974,
976 (D.Mass. 1983).
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Ervin's amendment and most of the amendments designed to weaken
the Act. 2 As a half-way measure, Senator Ervin then urged
expanding the 702 exemption to include non-religious as well as
religious activities of religious organizations and church-related
colleges. The Senate approved the alternative after minimal debate,
striking the modifier "religious" from the term "religious activities"
used in the 1964 version. The House acceded to the Senate bill,
resulting in an expansion of section 702 that allows religious societies,
corporations, associations and educational institutions to discriminate
"with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on ...of its activities.""
Divining a rationale for the 1972 expansion of section 702 is all
but impossible. First and foremost, one is faced with a situation
where the primary sponsor of the ultimate language was opposed to
the overall bill,54 as Ervin proposed his amendment chiefly to weaken
Title VII. Successful "poison pen" amendments invariably are
unreliable indicators of congressional intent. Even if one accepts
Ervin's amendment at face value, the record indicates that his
overriding concern was to exempt southern private colleges entirely
from the Act. Debate focused chiefly on this issue. As the debate
progressed, Ervin seized on religious autonomy concerns by
emphasizing the proposed law's impact on religious colleges, arguing
that it would require church-related colleges to hire "an atheist, or a
Mohammedan, or an agnostic... to teach chemistry, or economics or
sociology." 56 Only later did Senators Ervin and Allen expand their
points to include the law's impact on other religious institutions such
as churches and religious hospitals. The bulk of the debate that gave
birth to section 702, however, focused on this complete exemption for
private colleges, not on a need to exempt religious institutions
52. See 118 CONG. REC. at 1995; THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
1972, supra note 14, at 410-12.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
54. See PAUL R. CLANCY, JUST A COUNTRY LAWYER: A BIOGRAPHY OF SENATOR
SAM ERVIN 178, 195-97, (1974) (noting Ervin's general opposition to Title VII and court
mandated desegregation, and how Ervin "became the intellectual darling of the
segregationists.").
55. See 118 CONG. REC. at 946-49; 1975-95.
56. 118 CONG. REC. at 948. See also comments by Senator Allen, id. at 946 ("Under
the provisions of the bill, there would be nothing to prevent an atheist being forced upon a
religious school to teach some subject other than theology. A religious school would not
like to have an atheist or people of a different faith teaching other subjects and confining
its right to be selective in the choice of its faculty only to those phases of the work carrying
out its religious activities").
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generally.
Even when Ervin and Allen directed their remarks toward
religious institutions, arguments supporting the need for expanding
section 702 were few. Ervin provided no examples of overreaching by
the EEOC nor elaborated on how adherence to the original,
narrower exemption inhibited religious exercise or church autonomy.
The closest he came to explaining the need for the amendment was
the conclusory statement that "we are not securing religious liberty
from invasion of civil authorities when we give the civil authorities
power to regulate whom religious institutions, such as religious
corporations, religious educational institutions, and religious societies
can employ."57 Such statements, of course, only begged the question
of what religious liberty interests were at stake and how government
regulation impacted those interests. Yet time and again, Ervin fell
back on the rhetorical claim that the exemption was needed "to take
the political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they
have no place to be."58 He simply never offered a First Amendment
basis for expanding the exemption beyond making such pithy
remarks.
Only one senator, Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey, the bill's
manager, challenged Ervin's claim that the more limited exemption
threatened free exercise interests. Although agreeing with Ervin that
"the Government should not be involved in religious activities,"
Williams insisted that the original exemption was already consistent
with "the spirit of the first amendment," and that Title VII's
prohibition would not apply in "an area where we have a first
amendment situation, where we have religious activities."5 9 He
pointed to the fact that religious corporations often provide "purely
secular services" and jobs that are "identical to jobs in comparable
secular institutions," such as hospitals.' Significantly, Williams twice
raised the issue of employees working in religiously affiliated social
service agencies that serve the public, arguing that the exemption
should not apply in those contexts.6 ' Unfortunately, Williams' other
remarks were as conclusory as those of Ervin: "[I]t is not clear to me

57. Id. at 1982.
58. Id. at 4503. Similar statements appear id. at 946, 1977, 1980, 1982.
59. Id. at 1982.
60. Id. at 1992.
61. Id. at 1992, 4813. Neither Ervin nor Allen responded to Williams' concern,
referring instead to the need of churches to hire secretaries and janitors of the same faith.
Id. at 1979, 1982.
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that the religious integrity of these institutions would be
compromised by equal employment opportunities for employees in
positions unrelated to religious activities of such institutions."62 In the
end, Williams never forced Ervin to explain the need for a broader
exemption.63 One is left with a record that lacks meaningful
consideration of the free exercise interests at stake or how the
amendment expressly furthered those interests in contexts involving
employees not engaged in religious functions.
As mentioned, Ervin's amendment for a total exemption failed.
That result might suggest that a majority of the senators agreed with
Senator Williams that there was no need to accommodate religious
interests beyond what was contained in the original version of section
702. But the matter did not end there. Three weeks later, Ervin's
fall-back amendment that ultimately became section 702 passed with
minimal debate, with Senator Williams again disputing that "the
religious integrity of these institutions would be compromised by
providing equal job opportunities for employees in positions
unrelated to the religious activities of such institutions. ' 64 Whether
this means that a Senate majority now disagreed with Williams'
analysis or members were merely worn down by Ervin's relentless
attacks on Title VII such that they were willing to compromise, no
one can say.
As a result, the legislative purpose behind section 702 is
ambiguous at best.65 Congress' motive in expanding the exemption is
obscured by the efforts of Senators Ervin and Allen chiefly to weaken
Title VII.
Concerns about religious discrimination and
accommodation were three steps removed from the heart of the
debate which focused on Ervin's total exemption for private colleges.
When those arguments did arise, they were typically in the form of
fodder for and against the underlying goal of Ervin's amendment.
Considered in this light, it is most accurate to view the expansion of
section 702 as a successful attempt to chip away at the scope and
effectiveness of Title VII and the nation's commitment to eradicating
discrimination in the workplace.
62. Id. at 1991.
63. Ervin responded by declaring that he was "trying to take the political hands of
Caesar off all religious corporations, off all religious associations, and off all religious
societies." Id.
64. Id. at 4813.
65. Accord Duane E. Okamoto, "Religious Discrimination and the Title VII
Exemption for Religious Organizations,"60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (1987) (observing
that the reasons for the 1972 amendment are "not entirely clear").
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This conclusion is understandably unsettling to supporters of
section 702. One possible response is that, despite Ervin and Allen's
questionable motives, the principles and goals underlying a religious
exemption were already in place in the 1964 version, providing the
exemption-and any subsequent expansion-with an independent
legitimacy on which to build. Under this view, Ervin and Allen
merely sought (successfully) to exploit that legitimacy, such that the
independent validity of the exemption remains untarnished by the
mixed motives of the amendment's sponsors, which cannot be
attributed to Congress generally. This approach, however, takes us
back to square one, as the 1964 debates contain no information as to
the purpose of the exemption that can be grafted onto the 1972
expansion.
Even assuming more was at stake in 1972 than merely gutting
Title VII, the bulk of the debate over section 702 took place in the
context of Ervin's amendment to exempt religious educational
institutions and organizations entirely from Title VII's proscriptions.
Ervin's chief concern was to allow southern church-related colleges to
continue to discriminate in their employment practices;' expanding
section 702 to cover other religious institutions was of secondary
concern, and the issue may have been raised as much for its rhetorical
effect as out of a commitment to First Amendment principles.67 Not
surprisingly, considering the paltry debate, Congress did not consider
whether the 702 exemption should apply to religious institutions or
programs that received government funding. The record, therefore, is
a bad indicator of the purposes and goals of the expanded 702
exemption or its application to funded situations.
Constitutional Values
The lack of a clear legislative rationale for the religious
exemption to Title VII does not mean that one is unavailing. On the

66. Ervin was apparently motivated in part by his association with Davidson College,
a North Carolina college affiliated with the Southern Presbyterian Church, on whose
board of trustees Ervin served. Ervin referred to Davidson throughout his remarks. 118
Cong. Rec. at 948.
67. Accord, Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791, 807 (D.C. Utah
1984) ("Excerpts from the Congressional Record demonstrate that the proposes [Ervin]
amendment was directed at religious educational institutions and not at religious
organizations per se."). See also King's Garden v. F.C.C., 498 F.2d 51, 54 (DC Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) ("The sponsors of the 1972 exemption were chiefly
concerned to preserve the statutory power of sectarian schools and colleges to
discriminate on religious grounds in the hiring of all of their employees.").
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contrary, the constitutional values supporting some form of
exemption should stand independent of the legislative history. Three
interrelated yet distinct constitutional values can be seen as
supporting the ability of religious organizations to practice religious
discrimination in their employment practices. These I shall define as
observance, autonomy, and entanglement. Although all are derived
from the First Amendment and are complementary, each serves a
unique function."
The rights recognized under the Free Exercise Clause have
arisen primarily through two types of cases. The most obvious type of
claim involves the ability of individuals to believe and observe their
faith as they feel they are called. This interest not only encompasses
the ability to worship in private but also to proselytize and order
one's life activities according to the dictates of one's faith.69 Such
cases have rarely involved government regulation of belief or internal
worship practices; more frequently, they have involved allegations
that an otherwise neutral government action or regulation has
substantially burdened an individual's ability to practice or follow his
or her sincerely held faith, such as when a compulsory educational
attendance law conflicts with the theological beliefs of Amish parents
to limit their children's formal education, or when a fair housing
ordinance prohibits a landlord from refusing to rent to an unmarried
couple because their apparent sexual lifestyle offends the landlord's
religious sensibilities.7 °
The notion that the Free Exercise Clause protects against undue
government interference with religious observance has been extended
to embrace the shared interests of a community of believers. The
Court has recognized, and rightly so, that religious belief and
observance are often expressed-and for some are only fully
realized-in communal forms.71 In fact, one could argue that the
68. See Douglas Laycock, "Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy," 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373 (1981) (distinguishing between burdens on religious practice and entanglement and
church autonomy concerns).
69. Id. at 1389; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04, 307 (1940).
70. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Smith v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
71. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1872) ("The right to organize voluntary
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious
doctrine ... is unquestioned."). "The free exercise interest in being free from government
intrusions into religious belief encompasses groups as well as individuals, in order to
address the fact that much of religious life is inherently associational, interposing the
religious community or organization between the state and the individual believer."
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religious group or association is central to religious liberty generally.

Consequently, a church may assert a free exercise claim based on
government imposed burdens on its ability to form, observe, or
disseminate its religious beliefs and to associate with like believers
and govern its internal operations, and do so without relying on its
members' individual interests. 73 Although a church may raise burden
claims similar to those raised by an individual believer, the autonomy
interest is unique to bodies of believers, and represents a separate

strain of free exercise jurisprudence that protects the right of
churches to organize and manage their institutions free of
government interference.74 As the Court affirmed in the early 1950s,
the free exercise interest guarantees "a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation,
in short, the power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church governance as well as faith and
doctrine. 7 5
The final related interest-entanglement-derives from the

Establishment Clause and prevents government inhibition of religion
by forbidding excessive oversight or surveillance of religious
organizations.76 Although entanglement is best known from public

funding cases, the concern has found expression in other contexts
involving government regulation of religious institutions.77 Thus in
the church polity line of cases, the Court foreswore civil authority
over church tribunals not only because it encroaches on religious
autonomy, but also because secular authorities will exercise excessive
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-1 (Foundation Press,
1978). See also Frederick M. Gedicks, "Towards a ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof Group
Religious Rights," 1989 WiSC. L. REV. 99.
72. See Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ("In a free government the security for
civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the
multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security
in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects."). See Bruce N. Bagni,
"Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by
Religious Organizations,"79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1540 (1979) (noting that the existence
of a diverse number of religious groups serves to diffuse religious power).
73. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440,449 (1969).
74. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952). See also
E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (identifying two strands of
free exercise interests).
75. 344 U.S. at 116.
76. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
77. See Tony& Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec' of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985); Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,603 (1979).
LAURENCE H.
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oversight of religious matters." The concern, the Court indicated, is
that "the State will become entangled in essentially religious
controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular
doctrinal beliefs." 9 Entanglement, therefore, represents the flip side
of the autonomy coin, and is as concerned with the process and
degree of government involvement in religious matters as it is with
the potential consequences of such involvement.'
The potentially burdening effect of a regulation prohibiting
religious organizations from hiring co-religionists for religious
functions is readily apparent. The ability to associate with cobelievers by enforcing membership requirements and to restrict
leadership to those who share the same beliefs is crucial for a body's
religious identity, expression, and self-survival.8 1 The burden on
religious observance or practice lessens considerably, however, if an
employee subject to the regulation is not engaging in religious
activities or functions.82 A church janitor, for example, may be able to
clean a sanctuary in a respectful manner without adhering to the
tenets of that faith, and his handling of sacred relics would not take
on the same religious significance as when a priest manipulates the
relics during worship. Assuming that the line between religious and
non-religious activity can be determined-which, admittedly, may not
always be the case-a neutral regulation of the latter will not
necessarily inhibit an organization's ability to define or disseminate
its doctrines or beliefs. 3 The relevant inquiry is not whether a
religious entity is regulated but the impact of that regulation on a
church's ability to exercise its sincerely held beliefs.' Even then, the

78. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (insisting that the "neutral principles"
approach to reviewing inner-church disputes would "free civil courts completely from

entanglement into questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice."); see Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
79. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709.
80. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979); E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press, 676
F.2d 1272,1282 (9th Cir. 1982).
81. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
478 U.S. 1020 (1986); see also Bagni, supra note 72, at 1540.
82. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999)

("[I1n the case of lay employees, the Free Exercise rationales supporting an exception to
Title VII are missing.").

83. Bagni, supranote 72, at 1544.
84.

See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985)

("[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental
program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's
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task of succeeding on such a claim became noticeably more difficult
after the Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
which held that burdens arising through a neutral law did not violate
the free exercise clause." The implication from the Employment
Division holding is that there is no constitutional entitlement to a
religious accommodation from a generally neutral law like Title VII.
The more compelling justification for the 702 exception rests on
The autonomy and
autonomy and entanglement grounds.86
entanglement interests serve to ensure that public officials do not
intrude into decisions that arguably involve matters of church
governance, faith, or doctrine, or make determinations whether
religious beliefs are legitimate or asserted in good faith.'
Employment decisions concerning employees engaged in religious
functions are likely to turn on theological or doctrinal issues: does the
ministerial candidate truly believe in the inerrancy of scripture; how
closely does a priest agree with the Catholic Church's teachings on
euthanasia; why the choir director prefers old-time gospel music over
that by Monteverdi.' Interference with a religious body's ability to
chose its own leaders or representatives affects the very ability of the
body to organize and govern its operations, determine and
disseminate its doctrine, and to carry out its religious mission.
Similarly, government scrutiny of church employment decisions might
involve evaluations of motives of church administrators that are
based on religious rationales.' The potential for intrusive review or
ongoing supervision of religious decision-making is what triggers the
entanglement concern. 9'

freedom to exercise religious rights."); see also E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 488
(5th Cir. 1980).
85. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Mutterperl, supra note 34, at 413-15.
86. See E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
strands of free exercise interests ad holding that the autonomy strand survived
Employment Division); see also, Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203
F.3d 1229, 1302-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Texas Ann. Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999).
87. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976);
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Laycock, supra note 68, at 1394-98.
88. See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 464 (holding that theology professor's position
involved matters of church doctrine); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999)
(church choir director's duties involved selection of religious music).
89. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714; Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). See also Laycock, supra note 68, at 1397-1402.
90. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
91. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694 (opining that "pervasive monitoring for subtle or
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Where the employee is engaged in arguably secular functions,
however, autonomy and entanglement concerns lessen considerably,
as regulation of such positions is less likely to intrude upon matters of
church governance, faith, or doctrine. 2 Also, more recent Court
holdings indicate that ongoing oversight raises fewer entanglement
concerns where the relationship is not religious in nature or, again,
the regulated activities are secular.93
Church autonomy interests are also stronger when the issues
involve internal expressions of the church's operations: the
determination of tenets, doctrine, and liturgy; the conducting of
worship, catechism, and religious instruction; the selection of clergy
and determining membership requirements." Such spiritual activities
and relationships represent integral facets of religious practice and
can "be thought of as compromising the core or heart of a church."95
Characteristic of such internal relationships and activities is that they
often take place in private and almost always involve persons who
have voluntarily assented to the religious activity, often as members.'
In these contexts, the autonomy and entanglement concerns become
paramount against the interest in government regulation.
Radiating out from such core activities and relationships,
however, are layers of activities and relationships that are less
inwardly directed, have more indicia of secularity, and frequently
involve individuals who have not voluntarily assented to the spiritual
authority of the church: church-run soup kitchens and food pantries
serving local poor and homeless; interactions with vendors who
supply both religious and nonreligious commodities; contracts with
repairmen who make improvements on church structures.'
overt presence of religious matter is a central danger against which we have declared the
Establishment Clause guards against") (internal quotations omitted); accord, Pac. Press
676 F.2d at 1282.
92. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302-03 (1985); accord
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97 ("[Rjoutine regulatory interaction which involves no
inquiries into religious doctrine.., no delegation of state power to a religious body ...
and no detailed monitoring and close administrative contact between secular and religious
bodies.., does not of itself violated the nonentanglement command.") (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
93. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988).
94. See Laycock, supra note 68, at 1403; Bagni, supra note 72, at 1539; Shelley K.
Wessels, "The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination
Policies," 41 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1219-20 (1989).
95. Bagni, supra note 72, at 1539.
96. Laycock, supra note 68, at 1405-06.
97. See Bagni, supra note 68, at 1539-49 (Discussing a model of concentric circles
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Government regulation of such outward relationships, while
indirectly impacting a church's operations, has less effect on its
spiritual character.
To be sure, many activities that are public and outwardly
directed may be central to the core religious functions of a church.
Proselytizing or sharing of one's faith necessarily involves public
contact with non-members,98 and many outward functions of churches
are integral to their defining religious mission: the operation of
parochial schools, hospitals, orphanages and other charitable
Churches commonly regard the provision of social
endeavors.'
services "as a means of fulfilling religious duty and of providing an
example of the way of life a church seeks to foster."' ° That is why
some scholars have suggested that the level of spiritual intensity
associated with the activity or relationship is also a crucial factor."'
Few would dispute that Mother Theresa's ministry to the poor of
Calcutta was spiritually directed even though it took place in the
streets.
At the same time, however, church officials realize that the more
outwardly directed their activities, the more they must follow general
Church busses
rules and regulations imposed by civil authorities."
that pick up children for Sunday School must observe the speed
limits, even if that interferes with getting to services on time. So too,
fire, building and health requirements, though ultimately affecting a
church's operations, interfere less with the ability to define and
express its religious identity than regulation of whom a church may
select as its clergy. Thus, even though a church operated business
may provide an environment for the spiritual growth of its employees
and the income derived from the business may finance the church's
spiritual ministries, involvement in the commercial market will
expectantly involve greater governmental regulation of employment
relationships, particularly where the church business competes with

representing various levels of religiosity and externality).
98. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943).
99. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 413 (parochial school); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (hospital); E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian
Ministries, 708 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wa. 1992) (retirement home).
100. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
concurring).
Amos, 483 U.S. 327,344 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
101. Laycock, supra note 68, at 1409-10.
102. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985); Lemon,
403 U.S. at 614.
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secular counterparts. ' 3
As a result, autonomy and entanglement concerns diminish the
more that an employment relationship involves duties that do not
involve core religious functions, are less spiritually intense, and are
directed outward into the profane world. The more that a particular
position is removed from sacramental, pastoral or ecclesiastical duties
and is engaged primarily with nonmembers in public contexts, the
lesser chance that a regulation of that employment relationship will
interfere with church autonomy interests or entangle government in
religious controversies. Quite simply, it paints with too broad a brush
to claim that all church employment relationships and duties trigger
the same free exercise interests merely because they all involve
matters of church administration or decision-making.
In fact, in the same church polity cases where the Court
identified the autonomy interest, it commonly emphasized that the
issues involved "purely ecclesiastical matters,"' ° or matters that were
"strictly and purely ecclesiastical, '"5 suggesting a recognition that the
autonomy interest is strongest when the proposed regulation concerns
internal matters. This interpretation is also consistent with Title VII
itself, which permits discrimination on the basis of religion but
prohibits religious organizations discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, or sex.'" Implicit in Title VII is the assumption that
discrimination on the basis of race, sex or national origin would
normally occur in nonspiritual contexts and involve more outward
operations of religious organizations. And as discussed in the next
section, courts have universally held that adhering to such regulation
07
does not implicate exercise, autonomy or entanglement concerns.
Accordingly, Title VII recognizes a scale of relationships and
intrusions, not all of which implicate free exercise values.

103. See Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299.
104. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
105. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976).
106. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); Rayburn v.
Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 1166 (4th Cir. 1985); E.E.O.C.
v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Section-by-Section
Analysis to the Conference Report on H.R. 1746, "The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972," in THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 (1973) at 128

("[Religious corporations, associations, educational institutions and societies] remain
subject to the provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color, sex, or national origin.").
107. See discussion infra at note 111.
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The Legal Interpretation of Section 702
The absence of a clear legislative rationale for the 702 exemption
has not deterred litigation on the scope of Title VII and section 702,
which has been, in a word, robust. This should not be surprising
considering that religious corporations and associations own and
operate a kaleidoscope of for-profit and non-profit businesses and
institutions, including major hospital centers, nursing and retirement
homes, religious colleges and parochial schools, television and radio
stations, publishing houses, hotels, and companies engaged in clothing
production and food preparation." Accurate figures for the number
of employees of church-related enterprises are hard to come by, but
estimates safely run in the millions. Like any employer, a religious
business may face charges that its employment practices are unfair
and discriminatory. Unlike other employers, religious organizations
have been able to fall back on the protections provided under Title
VII, and through the crucible of litigation have sought to direct
judicial construction of the exemption.
Several interpretations of Title VII and section 702 are pertinent
here. First, courts have universally rejected arguments based on
statutory construction and the First Amendment that Title VII does
not apply to religious institutions. In one early case, McClure v.
Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit held that the Salvation Army was an
"employer" and an "industry affecting commerce" as defined under
the Act, despite also finding that the Army was a church." The court
relied on clear intent by Congress to include religious organizations
under the Act except as provided in the exemption. " ' In line with this
construction, courts have held that religious organizations remain
subject to the other prohibitions on employment discrimination based
108. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987) (sports recreation center, clothing and food production);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 292 (1985) (service stations,
retail clothing, grocery stores, construction companies, motel, candy production and
distribution); N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop, 740 U.S. 490 (1979) (parochial schools);
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991)
(hospitals); Tressler Lutheran Home, 677 F.2d 302 (3rd Cir. 1982) (nursing homes);
E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, 708 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wa. 1992) (retirement
homes); Pac. Press, 672 F.2d at 302 (publishing company); King's Garden v. F.C.C., 498
F.2d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (radio station); Feldstein v. The Christian Science Monitor,
555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983) (newspaper).
109. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556-57 ("Organizations affecting commerce may not escape
the coverage of social legislation by showing that they were created for fraternal or
religious purposes.").
110. Id.at558.
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on race, color, sex and national origin."' Similarly, courts have
uniformly turned away claims that the mere application of Title VII
to religious institutions violates the Free Exercise and Establishment
clauses. Even "wholly sectarian" institutions such as seminaries and
church associations have lost such constitutional claims."2 In most
instances, courts have held that complying with Title VII and the
accompanying reporting and enforcement powers of the EEOC place
minimal burdens on the operations and functions of religious

institutions and, even then, the government's interest in eradicating
discrimination is of the "highest order."11 3 The relevant inquiry,

according to one court, is not the impact of Title VII on the religious
institution, but "the impact of the statute upon the institution's
exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs."1 . Courts have also
held that submission to EEOC jurisdiction and compliance with
reporting requirements results in minimal government entanglement
with religious matters. "5
Religious organizations have not been on the losing end of all
Title VII controversies. On the contrary, in several areas courts have
interpreted Title VII permissibly in ways that have benefitted
religious entities at the expense of claimants. First, even prior to the
1972 amendment, courts began to read a constitutionally compelled
"ministerial exception" into Title VII that allows religious institutions
to discriminate on any basis-race, gender, national origin-for
The exception, first
employment decisions involving clergy." 6
111. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe
legislative history of Title VII makes clear that Congress formulated the limited
exemptions for religious institutions to discriminate based on religion with the
understanding that provisions relating to nonreligious discrimination would apply to such
institutions."). See also Boyd v. Harding Academy, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996);
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166; Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1276; E.E.O.C. v.Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d
477,484 (5th Cir. 1980); McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
112. See E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 281,
286-87 (5th Cir. 1981); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167. Accord Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 488
(Title VII applies even though college is pervasively sectarian).
113. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; accord Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1280 ("the elimination
of all forms of discrimination [is] a 'high priority."').
114. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 488.
115. Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1282; Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 487-88.
116. See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir.
2000) (barring retaliation claim by clergy); Combs v. Central Texas Ann. Conf. United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (barring sex discrimination claim of female
clergy applicant); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (barring sex
discrimination claim of theology professor); Young v. Northern I11.Conf. of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (barring sex and race discrimination claim
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recognized by the Fifth Circuit in McClure"7 and later adopted by
most of the circuits, " 8 removes entirely all aspects of the employment
relationship between a church and its clergy from Title VII scrutiny."9
Recognizing that the church-pastor relationship lies at the core of
religious autonomy concerns, 2 ° courts have disabled themselves from
hearing discrimination claims brought by clergy, even when those
claims allege the employment action was racially or gender
motivated. 2 ' As one court has stated, "[a] church's selection of its
own clergy is one such core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance
with which the state may not constitutionally interfere. 1 22 In practice,
this blanket exception relieves religious employers from having to
articulate a religious reason for their action-or any reason for that
matter. Courts have ruled that the free exercise interest at stake
"protects the act of a decision, rather than the motivation behind
it."'

23

Thus, pursuant to this exception recognized by a majority of the

judicial circuits, religious organizations may engage in any form of
employment discrimination involving its clergy without having to
justify their actions in religious terms. 24

of female pastoral applicant); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170-71 (same).
117. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
118. See cases cited supra note 116. See also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949 (9th Cir.);
Sharon, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575
(1st Cir. 1989).
119. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
120. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949 ("The determination of whose voice speaks for the
church is per se a religious matter .... We cannot imagine an area of inquiry less suited to
a temporal court for decision.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Young, 21 F.3d at 186 (barring action alleging sex and race discrimination);
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1165 (same).
122. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 ("A church must retain unfettered freedom in its choice
Indeed, the
of ministers because ministers represent the church to the people ....
ministerial relationship lies so close to the heart of the church that it would offend the
Free Exercise Clause simply to require the church to articulate a religious justification for
its personnel decisions."); accord Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 ("Any attempt by government
to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church's
free exercise rights.")
123. See Young, 21 F.3d at 186 ("In these sensitive areas, the state may no more
require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal
decisions."); accord Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. According to one commentator, the
ministerial exemption "is not an absolute constitutional entitlement; it derives from a
tenuous combination of the employers' free exercise right to noninterference in matters of
internal governance (a right [Employment Division v.] Smith affirmed), and their First
Amendment right to expressive association." Mutterperl, supra note 34, at 416.
124. Cf Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947-48 (where the court refused to extend protection
under the exemption against a claim of sexual harassment).
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Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, 25 courts generally have
read the ministerial exception broadly, deferring to the church's
definition of a ministerial role. Ordination or seminary education is
not determinative. 26 As one court stated:
[tihe ministerial exception has not been limited to members of
the clergy. It has also been applied to lay employees of
religious institutions whose 'primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual
and worship' ... If their positions are 'important to the spiritual
and pastoral
mission of the church,' they should be considered
127
'clergy.'

On the one hand, the Free Exercise and Equal Protection clauses
likely mandate an expanded interpretation of 'clergy;' otherwise, the
availability of the exception would turn on whether a church's tenets
require a professional clergy, thus disadvantaging those faiths without
a clergy class or with a strong tradition of 'priesthood of the believer.'
On the other hand, the exclusion of a large class of lay employees
from Title VII's coverage-including its prohibitions on racial,
gender, and ancestry discrimination-would undermine the
effectiveness of Title VIIV Under this permissive view of clergy, the
exception has been successfully applied to not only senior pastors but
121
3
also associate ministers,
church choir directors, " ' hospital
3
32
chaplains, ' members of religious orders, and theology professors

125. See E.E.O.C. v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir.
1981) (concluding that staff positions at seminary were not covered by the ministerial
exception: "When churches expand their operations beyond the traditional functions
essential to the propagation of their doctrine, those employed to perform tasks which are
not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious are not 'ministers' of a 'church' entitled to
McClure-type protection."); accord, E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.
1980) (rejecting claim that non-theological faculty at church-related college are entitled to
ministerial exception: "That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of
practicing Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment
matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.").
126. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (noting that the ministerial exception "does not depend
upon ordination but upon the function of the position.").
127. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
128. See Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 287.
129. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1165.
130. Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Bay View United
Methodist Church, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
131. Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
132. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 455.
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and seminary administrators,"' thus blocking any consideration of

allegations that the employment
actions were based on race, gender,
134
ancestry, age or disability.

As is evident from this listing, the ministerial exception has not
only been extended vertically but also horizontally.

Although

commonly thought of as applying to pastors in churches or houses of
worship, the ministerial exception is available to all religious
organizations that qualify for the religious exemptions under Title
VII (see discussion below). Courts have held that the exception
applies to clergy employed in non-church contexts such as religiously
affiliated hospitals and non-profit organizations.35

As with the definition of clergy, judicial interpretation of section
702 has expanded the scope of eligible exemptees. Other than
defining 'religion' for the purposes of religious accommodation,136
Title VII does not state what type of institution qualifies as a religious
organization entitled to the exemption.137 Although courts have
imposed some limits on the types of organizations that are entitled to
the exemption, 131 theetrn
trend has been to extend coverage beyond the
paradigm of churches, mosques, synagogues, and other houses of
worship and religious seminaries to include agencies and entities that
have ties to religious bodies and denominations.
Whether a
religiously affiliated institution is entitled to the exemption depends

upon "[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics" of the
entity, with the ultimate inquiry being whether the entity's purpose

133. Id.; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277.
134. See Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989);
E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277, 283 ('ministers' may include non-ordained
faculty).
135. See Scharon, 929 F.2d 360 (barring Title VII and ADEA claims by chaplain
against church-affiliated hospitals); Natal, 878 F.2d 1575 (barring clergy claim against nonprofit religious corporation).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
137. With respect to educational institutions, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(e) (2003) defines
eligible institutions as a "school, college, or other educational institution or institution of
learning [that] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society, or if the curriculum of such school, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion."
138. E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Schs., 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990); E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg.
Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988); Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home, 547 F. Supp.
286 (E.D. Va. 1982), affid on other grounds, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
139. Townley Eng'g, 859 F.2d at 618.
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and character are "primarily religious."'"
Absent a few notable cases,' 4' most religiously affiliated entities

have not had a difficult time meeting this standard. Thus courts have
upheld extending section 702 to hospitals, nursing homes, retirement
homes, publishing companies, newspapers, and colleges that have
historic or financial ties to religious bodies or denominations. 42 What
is significant in this interpretation is that an institution need not be
43
"pervasively sectarian" in order to qualify for the exemption;

neither have all courts required that the primary functions of the
covered institutions -as
distinguished from their purpose or
character-be religious in order to qualify for the exemption. Liberal
arts colleges and professional schools with little more than historic

ties to church bodies have satisfied the test.'" As one court declared,
"[i]n order to constitute a 'religious corporation' or an 'educational
institution,' as those terms are used in the Title VII exemption, it is
not necessary that a narrow
spectrum of Christian or of Baptist
45
doctrine be espoused.'
Religious organizations have benefitted from other favorable
interpretations of Title VII and the 702 exemption. At least one

circuit has attempted to graft the ministerial "no explanation" rule
onto employment claims raised by non-clergy.

In EEOC

v.

Mississippi College, the Fifth Circuit, while determining that regular
faculty of a church-related college did not qualify for the ministerial
exception, held that a religious institution should be excused from

responding to claims of race and sex discrimination if the institution
presents "convincing evidence" that the challenged employment
practice resulted from discrimination based on religion.'" In essence,
140. Id.; accord Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th
Cir. 2000); Kamehameha Schs., 990 F.2d at 460.
141. Notable exceptions include Kamehameha Schs., where the Ninth Circuit found
that a private school operating within the historic tradition of Protestantism was
essentially a secular institution, 990 F.2d at 463-64; and Fike, where the district court found
that a children's home operated under the auspices of the United Methodist Church was a
secular institution, 547 F. Supp. at 289-90.
142. See sources cited infra note 168.
143. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198-99 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Hall, 215
F.3d at 624-25 (Baptist affiliated medical school entitled to exemption); Siegel v. TruettMcConnell Coll., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (church-related liberal arts college
entitled to exemption).
144. See sources cited supra note 143.
145. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 917 F. Supp. 773, 776 (N.D. Ala. 1996), affd, 113 F.3d
196 (11th Cir. 1997).
146. E.E.O.C. v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[I]f a religious
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the Fifth Circuit seemed to say that religious discrimination that
manifests itself as racial and gender discrimination would fall under
the 702 exemption, which would relieve the religious institution from
even responding to the non-religious claims. Apparently, no other
circuit has interpreted the exemption so broadly, with the Fourth and
Ninth circuits rejecting arguments that a religious organization's
religious justification for a gender-based decision bars consideration
of the non-religious claim. 47
This difference in approach has been less significant than might
appear at first blush. Despite Congress' clear intention that religious
organizations remain subject to Title VII's prohibitions on racial,
gender and national discrimination, courts have permitted religious
organizations to engage in effectively the same conduct under the
aegis of permissible religious discrimination. The language of section
702 exempts religious organizations from the law's prohibitions "with
'1 4
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion."
Though not evident from the language, courts have interpreted this
provision to apply not only to actions taken on the basis of an
employee's religious affiliation or belief, but also to those decisions
based on employee conduct that is inconsistent with the tenets and
teachings of the religious institution. Stated differently, courts have
held that it is a protected form of discrimination for a religious
organization to dismiss an employee of the same (or different) faith if
her lifestyle, sexual orientation or sexual practices (even when
engaged in outside of the work place) are inconsistent with church
doctrine.1 49 In many instances, this has blurred the line between
religious and nonreligious forms of discrimination. The following
cases illustrate the point.
The vast majority of cases under the "tenets and teachings"
approach have involved sex discrimination claims brought by women
employees who were dismissed after their religious employer
discovered they were pregnant outside of marriage. In Boyd v.
HardingAcademy of Memphis, the Sixth Circuit upheld the right of a
institution of the kind described in § 702 presents convincing evidence that the challenged
employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of religion, § 702 deprives
the E.E.O.C. of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether te religious
discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination.").
147. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166
(4th Cir. 1985); E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277, 1280 (9th Cir.
1982).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2003).
149. See cases discussed infra notes 150-156.
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religiously affiliated preschool to dismiss a pregnant teacher on the
grounds she had violated its prohibition against premarital sex. 5 This
was despite the teacher having otherwise satisfied the school's
requirement of being an evangelical Christian.' Other courts have
similarly ruled that section 702 permits a religious employer "to
employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with
the employer's religious precepts,' 52 effectively barring consideration
of many sex or pregnancy discrimination claims.'53
Similarly, in Hall v. Baptist Memorial Healthcare Corporation,
the Sixth Circuit held that a religiously-affiliated nursing college's
dismissal of employee based on her admission of lesbianism and her
ordination in non-denominational gay church was permissible
religious discrimination. "4 The college justified its action on the
ground that the claimant's leadership position in a pro-gay
organization clashed with the Southern Baptist Convention's
"outspoken denunciation of homosexuality."'55 Agreeing with the
college, the court held that the ability to employ "individuals of a
particular religion" under section 702 includes decisions to terminate
an employee "whose conduct
or religious beliefs are inconsistent with
' 56
those of its employer.'
Also, the mere fact that a religious institution has previously
declined to base its employment decisions on religious grounds does
not constitute a waiver of its Title VII right. On the contrary, courts
have held that the 702 exemption "cannot be waived" even when the
institution has otherwise held itself out as an equal opportunity
employer.'57 Thus a religious organization may fall back on its ability
to discriminate on religious grounds at any time and, provided that
justification is plausible, the organization may be protected from
claims of pretext or selective application.

150. 88 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1996).
151. Id.at411.
152. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3rd Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
153. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000); Ganzy v. Allen
Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F.
Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa
1980).
154. 215 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir. 2000).
155. Id. at 627. Interestingly, the college declined to justify its dismissal on the ground
that Hall-who was initially Presbyterian-was of a different faith. Id.
156. Id. at 624; Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D.
Ky. 2001).

157. Hall, 215 F.3d at 625; Little, 929 F.3d at 951.
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Only a handful of decisions have involved situations where a
religious organization that qualified under section 702 also received
some type of public financial support. "8 Absent one notable
exception discussed below,"9 in no instance did the government aid
directly fund the position in question; rather, the aid was typically in
the form of grants to individuals who accessed services at the religious
provider or paid for identifiably secular items." As a resut, courts
have generally held that section 702 is not waived merely because the

institution in question-most commonly, religiously affiliated
hospitals and colleges-also receives some public funding.16' On its
own, this holding is unremarkable, considering that religiouslyaffiliated hospitals commonly receive Hill-Burton construction grants
and Medicare and Medicaid payments and many church-related
colleges such as Notre Dame, Georgetown and Southern Methodist
University receive government research and student grant monies
while maintaining seminaries and religious studies departments.' 62 No
doubt, all of the colleges involved in the Court's college funding
decisions of the 1970s qualified for an exemption under sections 702
or 703.163 However, the aid in those cases was restricted to secular
uses, and the Court took pains to note that none of the institutions
imposed religious requirements on faculty hiring, except for
theological faculty and college chaplains who did not benefit from the
aid." As a result, the fact that a religious organization receives some
form of public aid does not, on its own, disqualify it from accessing
the protections of section 702. Conversely, the fact that a handful of
section 702 cases have involved religious institutions that received
public support does not answer the question of the permissibility of
relying on section 702 for employment actions involving publicly
funded employees.
How do these rulings impact FBOs participating in funded
First, it is clear churches and
Charitable Choice programs?
158. Hall, 215 F.3d at 625 (hospital grants); Seigel v. McConnell Coll., 13 F. Supp. 2d
1335, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (Pell Grants); Young v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., No. 882321-S, 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12248 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (Medicare payments).
159. See Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S88-0353, 1989 WL 53857 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 9,
1989).
160. See sources cited supra note 158.
161. Hall, 215 F.3d at 625; Seigel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
162. Hall, 215 F.3d at 625 (hospital grants); Seigel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
163. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
164. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755,757; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
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religiously-affiliated organizations will retain their section 702
eligibility for social service programming, provided that the FBO

meets the initial requirement that its purpose and character are
65
"primarily religious."'

While a handful of cases have disqualified

religious social service providers from relying on section 702, those
holdings were anomalous and turned on facts particular to those

cases. 1
The Church's involvement in charitable work is too
longstanding and well documented for courts to question its religious
foundations. 167 Second, it appears that an FBO does not waive its

status under section 702 merely because it receives some form of
public assistance. Religiously affiliated hospitals, colleges, parochial
schools, nursing and children's homes, and charitable organizations
can and do receive myriad forms of public financial and in-kind aid,
provided the aid does not pay for religious activity, while remaining
eligible under section 702."6 General eligibility, however, begs the
question of whether section 702 can be constitutionally applied to a

position receiving government funding.
The final question about how the interpretations of section 702

apply to Charitable Choice concerns the 'ministerial exception.' As
noted, courts generally have interpreted the ministerial exception
broadly to include non-ordained employees whose duties are
"important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church."' 69
Arguably, this could encompass not only part-time associate ministers
who are assigned to run a government funded program but also
counselors and case-workers who perform many of the direct services.
Supporters of Charitable Choice insist that the success of a faithinfused approach to social services turns on the ability of FBOs to
employ people of like faith and character.'70 The question then
165. Hall, 215 F.3d at 624; E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618
(9th Cir. 1988).
166. See Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home, 547 F. Supp. 286, 289-90 (E.D.
Va. 1982).
167. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327,344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (parochial schools); Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589 (1988) (religious charities); Tilton, 403 U.S. 672, (church-related colleges);
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (religiously affiliated hospital).
169. E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Rayburn v.
Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
170. See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 126 (1996) ("If the teachers or other

staff of a nonprofit agency cannot be hired on the basis of their faith commitments, the
religious character of that nonprofit would be destroyed.").
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becomes whether an FBO could consider all of its employees to be
"ministers" and thus not only discriminate on the basis of religion in
its employment decisions but on the basis of race, national origin and
gender as well. At least one Charitable Choice proponent argues that
courts should treat social service workers in FBOs as the equivalent
of clergy because they too interpret doctrine and represent the
mission of the organization.17' The implications of applying current
interpretations of section 702 and the ministerial exception to
Charitable Choice programs are therefore quite significant.
The Constitutionality of Section 702
The expansive interpretations of section 702, while based in part
on judicial assumptions of congressional goals in enacting the
exemption, rely on a presumption of the exemption's
constitutionality. As discussed, federal circuits have generally agreed,
although this has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court, that the
ministerial exception is mandated by three interrelated constitutional
interests: that government regulation of such "prime ecclesiastical"
matters as selecting one's clergy would burden religious practice and
inhibit religious autonomy interests, both of which are protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, and result in excessive government
oversight of and entanglement in religious matters.172 Outside of this
narrow area governing the employment relationships between
churches and their clergy, the religious practice, autonomy and
entanglement interests in allowing religious organizations
to
173
discriminate on religious grounds lessen considerably.
So long as section 702 was limited to employment decisions
involving employees engaged in religious functions, few questioned
the nexus between the exemption and the constitutional interests at
stake. With the 1972 expansion of section 702, however, some
observers claimed that allowing religious organizations to
discriminate on religious grounds with respect to employees engaged
in secular activities was not only not required under the Free Exercise
Clause but also that it advantaged religion in a way that violated the

171. See GLENN, AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE, 197-98 (2000).
172. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Bollard v.
Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1999); Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d at 461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167-69.

173. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 ("[I]n the case of lay employees, the Free Exercise
rationales supporting an exception to Title VII are missing.").
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Establishment Clause.174
The first case to consider the constitutionality of the 1972
amendment to section 702 was King's Garden v. FCC, which involved
an action by the Federal Communications Commission, pursuant to
the Communications Act, to prevent a religious radio station from
engaging in religious employment discrimination. 175 The radio station
defended its employment practices by relying on the section 702
exemption. Although ultimately holding that section 702 did not
override the Communications Act,176 the D.C. Circuit disputed the
constitutionality of the 1972 amendment. 77 Judge Skelly Wright
acknowledged that the original exemption "was itself required by the
First Amendment," but declared that the expanded exemption
permitting religious discrimination against employees engaged in
secular functions lacked a similar constitutional anchor. 78 On the
contrary, the exemption provided religious employers with a distinct
advantage over their secular counterparts. The exemption violated
the Establishment Clause by:
invit[ing] religious groups, and them alone, to impress a test of
faith on job categories, and indeed whole enterprises, having
nothing to do with the exercise of religion .... In creating this
gross distinction between the rules facing religious and nonitself on [a] collision
religious entrepreneurs, Congress placed
179
course with the Establishment Clause.
Nine years later a second federal court also expressed "grave
doubts" about the constitutionality of section 702, with the court
stating that the exemption gave preferential treatment for the secular
functions of religious enterprises over those of their secular
counterparts.' 8° As in King's Garden, however, the court was able to
174. See Bruce N. Bagni, "Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,"79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1548

(1979) ("[The] exemption runs afoul of the establishment clause, because it singles out
religious organizations for preferential treatment and thus confers a benefit or withholds a
burden on the basis of a purely religious classification.").
175. King's Garden v. F.C.C., 498 F.2d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 58 ("It dos not necessarily follow that Congress intended to abrogate the
F.C.C.'s own anti-bias rules [in enacting section 702].").
177. Id. at 53 ("The 1972 exemption is of very doubtful constitutionality.").
178. Id. at 56 ("[T]he 1972 exemption now shelters myriad 'activities' which have not
the slightest claim to protection under the Free Exercise, Free Speech, or Free Press
guarantees.").
179. Id. at 55.
180. Feldstein v. The Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D. Mass. 1983).
As in King's Garden, the district court held that the resolution of section 702's
constitutionality was ultimately unnecessary.
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resolve the case without holding section 702 unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of section 702 was squarely put at issue in
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos. 81 There, five employees of businesses
owned or operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

(the "Mormon Church" or "Church") sued the Church for
employment discrimination after they were fired from their jobs for
failing to satisfy the Church's worthiness requirement of a temple
recommend.'9 All of the plaintiffs claimed they had performed non-

religious functions in businesses that were only remotely connected to
the religious ministry or mission of the Mormon Church, and that to
exempt the Church's actions from Title VII's nondiscrimination
provisions violated the Establishment Clause. 83 The district court

found that one of the businesses, the Deseret Gymnasium, was not
involved in the "spread[ing] or teach[ing] [of] the religious beliefs and
doctrine and practices of sacred ritual of the Mormon Church," nor
were the fired employee's duties as building engineer "even
tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the

Mormon Church."'"

That being the case, the court then determined

that requiring the Mormon Church to follow Title VII with respect to

nonreligious employees would not infringe on its free exercise rights
or unnecessarily entangle the government in religious matters.
181. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
182. See Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Utah 1984). Four of the plaintiffs worked at
the Church-owned Beehive Clothing Mills which manufactured religious garments and
temple clothing, while the fifth plaintiff worked as building engineer for Deseret
Gymnasium, a Church-owned gymnasium open to the general public. Id. at 799-803.
Because the district court was initially unable to determine whether Beehive was engaged
in religious activity, only the claim involving the Deseret Gymnasium was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 803. See also Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Latter-Day Saints, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985).
183. Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 796.
184. Id. at 800, 802. The court found the primary function of the gymnasium was to
provide facilities for physical exercise and athletic games and was open to the general
public. Id. at 801. Despite finding that the gymnasium was not engaging in religious
activity, the court found that section 702 otherwise applied. Id. at 804.
185. Id. at 814-20. ("The question is whether requiring the defendants to refrain from
discriminating on the basis of religion in their secular, non-religious activities infringes the
free exercise of their religious beliefs. The court does not believe that it does. Preventing
religious discrimination in those instances can have no significant impact on the exercise of
'any sincerely held religious belief of the Mormon Church."') Id. at 818. The district court
also held that even if applying Title VII to the Church's non-religious employees burdened
its free exercise rights, the government had a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination that overrode those rights. Id. at 819.
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Finally, the district court agreed with the King's Garden court that the
exemption lacked sufficient facial neutrality to withstand

Establishment

Clause scrutiny because it authorized religious

organizations "to engage in conduct which can directly and
immediately advance religious tenets and practices."'"
A surprisingly unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the expanded section 702 did not violate the Establishment Clause.

The apparent unanimity of that holding belied a Court conflicted over
the basis for that conclusion. The five justice majority opinion,
written by Justice Byron White-and surprisingly joined in by Justice
John Paul Stevens-applied what can best be characterized as a less
To survive the
than rigorous Establishment Clause analysis.
requirement of a secular legislative purpose," the Court held that the

government could take religion into account when fashioning
legislative goals, provided it did not "abandon[] neutrality and act[]

with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious
matters."'"

The permissive goal here was to "alleviate significant

governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations
In so
to define and carry out their religious missions."'
characterizing Congress' goal in expanding section 702 the Court did
not rely on the legislative record for, as has already been discussed,
no such references exist.'" In fact, the majority acknowledged that
the original version of section 702 was adequate to protect this free
exercise interest, such that "the Free Exercise Clause required no

more.

19'

Despite this admission, the majority expressed concern that

186. Id. at 824-25.
187. The Court applied the first two prongs of the Lemon test, which requires that a
law have a" "primary secular purpose" and a "principle or primary effect... that neither
advances nor inhibits religion." Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-38 (1987). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602,612 (1971).
188. 483 U.S. at 335. It is highly surprising that Justice Stevens agreed with this
characterization of the secular purpose requirement. First, Stevens has generally opposed
both constitutional and legislative accommodations of religion. Second, Stevens has
joined on several opionins that have declared that the Establishment Clause requires more
than mere neutrality among religions (i.e., not promoting a particularpoint of view in
religious matters), but prevents promotion of religion generally over non-religious values.
See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
189. 483 U.S. at 335.
190. Rather, the Court relied on the district court's generous characterization of
Senator Ervin's statements in support of his original amendment that did not distinguish
between various forms of discrimination or address the free exercise interest implicated
under the original exemption. Id. at 336 (citing 594 F. Supp. at 812).
191. Id. at 336.
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courts would second-guess churches' determinations of religious and
secular activities, thus imposing a significant burden on the ability of
religions to define and carry out their religious functions. Congress
could permissibly seek to avoid such burdens through a broader
exemption.'92
Whether section 702 advanced religion by affording churches the
benefit of being able to discriminate in their employment practices-a
benefit that was not available to non-religious entities-presented a
more difficult issue for the Court. The majority acknowledged that
by virtue of the exemption churches "are better able now to advance
their purposes than they were prior to the 1972 amendment," which
in turn provided them with a financially advantageous practice denied
to their nonreligious counterparts. ' 93 However, the Court resolved the
conflict by constructing a syllogism that a law is not unconstitutional,
"simply because is allows churches to advance religion, which is their
very purpose," but only if "the government itself had advanced
religion through its own activities and influence."' 94 The syllogism, of
course, begged the very question the Court was called upon to
answer: whether Congress had advanced religion by permitting
religious entities and religious entities solely to engage in otherwise
impermissible business practices, particularly where such special
treatment was not constitutionally mandated. This led the four
concurring justices to take issue with the majority's characterization
of exemption's effect, with Justice O'Connor observing that the
distinction seemed "to obscure far more than to enlighten."' 9 The
Mormon Church's discriminatory act was legal, and thus permissible,
only because Congress had so declared through the exemption. As
O'Connor noted, the Church "had the power to put Mayson to a
choice of qualifying for a temple recommend or losing his job because
the Government had lifted from religious organizations the general
regulatory burden imposed by section 702.'' 6
Despite the potential implications of the syllogism, four aspects
192. Id.at 336 ("[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on
pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider
religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be
concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.").
193. Id.
194. Id. at 337.
195. See id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 340 n.1 (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Almost any government benefit to religion
could be recharacterized as simply 'allowing' a religion to better advance itself ....
").
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of the majority's advancement analysis indicate its limited scope.
First, in distinguishing between government advancements of religion
and those passive actions authorizing church advancements, the
majority pointed to "financial support" as an example of the former."
This oblique reference to financial support as crossing the line into
unconstitutional advancement is more significant than appears at first
blush. In arguing for the constitutionality of the exemption, the
Justice Department distinguished the putative benefit afforded
churches by section 702 from "direct money subsid[ies]" and
expressly declared that "Section 702 does not result in government
financial support of religious activities. ' ' 118 The distinction was again
made in oral argument, with counsel for both the government and the
Mormon Church emphasizing that "this is not a religious benefit[s]
case" and that it involved "no endorsement of [or] financial support
for... religious affairs by government."'" It is impossible to know
how crucial this factor was for the ultimate holding in Amos, but
apparently some members of the Court viewed it as significant.
Based on Justice Stevens' record in Establishment Clause funding
cases, 21 it is highly doubtful that his vote in Amos would have been
secured in the absence of assurances that government funding was not
The oblique reference to government funding thus
in issue.
understates the importance of that issue in the Court's decisionmaking. One could conclude that the absence of government funding
was a determining factor in holding section 702 constitutional. At a
minimum, it is safe to say that counsels' statements neutralized the
funding issue as a factor in Amos, such that the Court reserved that
question for another day. Either way, the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of section 702 cannot be said to cover situations
where the government is funding the institution practicing the
discrimination. More accurately, the Amos holding should be viewed
as presupposing the absence of government funding.
Second, despite holding that the exemption only "allowed" the
197. Id. at 337.
198. Merits Brief of Appellant United States at 38, 34, in Kurland & Casper,
Landmark Briefs and Arguments, vol. 173 (1988), at 211, 207. The brief of the Mormon
Church made a similar, though less explicit, distinction between the indirect effect of the
exemption and a financial grant or benefit. See Merits Brief of Appellant Corporation of
Presiding Bishop, et al., at 40 n.41; id. at 159.
199. Id. at 554, 556 (Arguments of Rex Lee and William Bradford Reynolds).
200. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983).
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Mormon Church to advance religion itself, "which is [its] very
purpose," the majority indicated that the record revealed no evidence
that section 702 increased the Church's ability "to propagate its
religious doctrine," intimating that such proof might lead to an
opposite conclusion."0 In contrast to the funding issue, it is less likely
that evidence the exemption enhanced the Church's proselytizing
capacity would have changed the ultimate outcome in Amos. Still,
the statement indicates a limit to the syllogism, such that a more
direct causal relationship between the exemption and an FBO's
ability to proselytize might be problematic. After all, Mr. Mayson
was not employed in a program or function that was initiated or
funded by the government. However, if a program is government
initiated and funded, then any proselytizing that takes place may be
viewed as being facilitated by the government.
A final limitation on the syllogism is found in the Court's prior
and subsequent holdings. The Amos majority declared, without
supporting authority, that singling out religious entities for a benefit
has never been considered per se invalid, particularly when the
government sought to accommodate a religious interest.2" Until that
time, however, the Court had upheld religion-only accommodations
only where a significant free exercise based burden had existed. 3
Here the only burden was interference with religious decision making
regarding secular matters, an interest the Court indicated was not
protected by the Free Exercise Clause."° Although the Court has not
repudiated its statement that religion-only accommodations are
permissible, it cut back on the effectiveness of that statement in
Texas Monthly v. Bullock by striking a religion-only tax exemption.0 5
A fractured Court indicated that legislative accommodations must
either alleviate significant burdens on religious exercise or have a
beneficiary class that includes "a large number of nonreligious groups
201. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987).

202. Id. at 338.
203. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
204. 483 U.S. at 336. The majority, however, characterized section 702 as lifting a
burden on religious exercise: "Where, as here, government with the proper purpose of
lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that
the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities." Id. at 338. As indicated
in part-infra,however, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
amended Title VII on the belief that religious organizations were unnecessarily burdened.
205. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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as well."21 6 Four years later, the Court reemphasized that religion-

only accommodations are problematic, unless the state is acting with
the purpose of "alleviating special burdens" on religious practice.' °7

In addition, the Amos holding gave short shrift to the issue of
whether the exemption allowed religious organizations to burden the

religious interests of their employees. In a footnote that restated the
syllogism, the Court declared that any burden on a third person's
religious

beliefs came

from the Church,

and

not from

the

government.2" The Court's attempt to distinguish section 702 from
the statute in Thornton v. Caldor requiring employers to
accommodate an employee's Sabbath request was transparent, as
both accommodations (and the resulting burdens they imposed on

third persons) were allowed only because they were authorized by
law.21 ' While the statute in Thornton mandated an accommodation
with resulting third person burdens, as opposed to making it merely
permissible, that distinction obscures the fact that in both instances
no burden on third persons could take place without government
authorization.1 Moreover, the syllogism has no bearing on the effect

of the burden on third persons when it occurs, which the Court has
indicated is the appropriate focus with permissive accommodations.1
In essence, where a legislative accommodation of religion is not
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, it should not result in
imposing substantial burdens on third persons.22

As addressed, the Amos majority's free exercise analysis was
subsumed in its discussion of the Establishment Clause. The only

206. Id. (noting that in prior accommodation cases that "benefits derived by religious
organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well); id. at 15, 18 n.8.
207. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704, 705 (1993) (noting that
Court holdings have "relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided
religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges."). See
Michele Estrin Gilman, "'CharitableChoice' and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling
the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses," 55 VAND. L. REV.
799, 883-84 (2002).
208. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15.
209. Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
210. Even if the Amos Court's distinction is correct, it does not explain the holding in
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982), where the Court declared that an exemption
for a religious employer from paying Social Security taxes would burden employees, even
though the option of taking the exemption would rest with the employer. Accord Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985).
211. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8; Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303; Lee, 455 U.S. at
261.
212. Id.; Thorton, 472 U.S. at 709-10; Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
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interest identified as support for the expanded exemption was to
minimize government interference with the decision making process
of religions."1 3 It fell to Justice Brennan in concurrence-possibly
because of his scepticism with the majority's Establishment Clause
analysis-to expand on the possible free exercise interest at stake.
Justice Brennan indicated that the exemption did more than merely
protect the decision-making processes by religions. It also promoted
a strong religious autonomy interest by allowing religions to define
According to
and control their polity and religious missions."'
a
large
degree from
Brennan, individual religious identity derives to
one's ability to participate in a larger community of like-minded
believers. In turn, religious organizations define themselves through
their members' shared beliefs and the ability to determine what
activities are consistent with those beliefs."5 Significantly, though,
Brennan acknowledged that this rationale only supported the need
for religious entities to discriminate on the basis of religion with
respect to religious activities. 6 This is because the burden on
religious self-definition is significantly less when dealing with secular
activities. Brennan conceded that this lack of a burden on selfdefinition likely rendered the exemption unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause while it imposed burdens on the religious
liberty interests of non-believing employees. 7 Like the majority,
however, the need to balance the countervailing interests, and
concerns about entanglement and chilling religious definition of
religious activity, tipped the balance for Brennan."'
What then does Amos tell us about the constitutional
implications of section 702? First and foremost, the Court -was
unanimous in the belief that the free exercise interests at stakewhether defined narrowly as by Justice White or broadly as by Justice
Brennan-were protected adequately under the pre-1972 exemption
that limited discrimination to employment associated with religious

213. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
214. Id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 343 ("Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an
organization's religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission should
conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines itself.").
216. "This rationale suggests that, ideally, religious organizations should be able to
discriminate on the basis of religion only with respect to religious activities." Id.
(emphasis in original).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 345.
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activities." ' There is no greater significant burden-at least one of a
constitutional nature-on the ability of a religious group to define
itself or associate with like-minded believers, or to design and carry
out its religious mission, when it is restricted in discriminating in its
secular employment practices than when the religious entity is
required to adhere to other neutral fair labor practices. 20 The mere
fact that a religious organization is impacted by regulation of some
secular function does not mean that its ability to exercise its religion
has been similarly impacted.22'
The primary concern justifying extending section 702 into nonreligious areas-the minimization of governmental interference with
the "decision-making process in religions 22--cannot be taken to
mean the full import of that statement. Decision-makers in religious
entities, like their secular counterparts, make a host of decisions day
in and day out that have nothing to do with religious faith, doctrine,
or mission: whether to pave the parking lot; where to place a mailbox;
when to order more toilet paper and cleaning supplies. Many
important decisions that implicate a church's financial choices and its
relations to government regulators also frequently have little to do
with religious matters: whether to install a city-required fire sprinkler
system in a church fellowship hall; whether to comply with a
municipal ordinance requiring facilities be wheel-chair accessible; or
whether to pay minimum wage rates for church secretaries and
janitors. To be sure, each situation involves religious officials making
decisions having financial implications that ultimately impact the
institution's religious ministry. But the constitutional value in
minimizing government interference with a religion's decision-making
process varies greatly depending on whether it concerns merely the
"decision-making process in religions" or the religious decisionmaking process. The burden or "chilling effect" on religion that
comes with having to predict a regulator's view of a particular activity
diminishes greatly when the religious entity is acting in response to
government requirements that are in addition to the entity's normal
functions. And clearly, the more that a religious organization is
implementing a government approved or financed program that by
definition is to be secular-as is supposed to be the case with
Charitable Choice-the less likely that government regulation is
219.
220.

Id. at 336, 343, 348.
See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,303-05 (1985).
221. See Fremont ChristianSch., 781 F.2d at 1369; Miss. Coil., 626 F.2d at 488.
222. Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
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interfering with a religious decision-making process.2

A point of reference is found in cases arising out of government
enforcement of collective bargaining and wage and hour laws. In the
1979 decision of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, the Court held that the
National Labor Relations Act did not apply to parochial schools.224

While deciding on statutory grounds, the Court relied on arguments
that subjecting the Catholic schools to N.L.R.B. authority would

present a "significant risk" of government entanglement through
review of employment decisions.225 Charges of unfair labor practices
would "necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the
school's religious mission. 226

An important factor in determining that N.L.R.B. jurisdiction
would risk oversight of church decision-making was the fact that the
schools were pervasively sectarian and that teachers played a "key
role" in furthering the religious mission of the Catholic Church.227

Lower courts have emphasized that distinction in subsequent
decisions. In the vast majority of N.L.R.B. cases involving religiously
affiliated entities other than parochial schools, courts have upheld
28

application of the Act, notwithstanding entanglement arguments.
In applying the Act to religiously-run children's and nursing homes
and religiously-affiliated social service agencies and hospitals, courts
have relied extensively on the non-religious nature of many of the
services performed by covered employees in order to find that Board

review of employment practices would not intrude into religious
decision-making.229 To be sure, several of the holdings reveal a

223. Alan Brownstein, "Constitutional

Questions About Charitable Choice" in
(1999) at 234.

WEFARE REFORM AND FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS

224. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
225. Id. at 502.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 501.
228. See N.L.R.B. v. Kemmerer Village, 907 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1990); N.L.R.B. v.
Salvation Army, 763 F.2d 1 (lth Cir. 1985); Volunteers of Am. v. N.L.R.B., 752 F.2d 345
(8th Cir. 1985); Denver Post of Volunteers of Am. v. N.L.R.B., 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir.
1984); St. Elizabeth Comm. Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983); Tressler
Lutheran Home v. N.L.R.B., 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982); N.L.R.B. v. St. Louis Christian
Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981).
229. Salvation Army, 763 F.2d at 6; Denver Post, 732 F.2d at 772-73; St. Elizabeth
Comm. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1441; Tressler, 677 F.2d at 305; St. Louis Christian Home, 663
F.2d at 64. In finding that the functions were primarily secular, courts also emphasized
that the various homes, agencies and hospitals did not impose religious tests for covered
employees and received public funds for their services. Id.
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cramped view of how the service programs relate to the churches'
religious mission.23 ° But the question of whether care of the sick or
elderly is consistent with a denomination's religious ministry is
different from whether the activities themselves are essentially
secular. Even if specific functions could not be easily categorized,
courts have held that Board review of employment decisions placed
minimal burdens on religious practices. 3
Merely because a
regulation imposes certain reporting and compliance requirements on
a religious entity does not mean that it substantially burdens or
inhibits religious practice.232 Significantly, several N.L.R.B. cases
involved religious social service agencies that received state
placements or referrals and public monies to fund their welfarerelated programs.f 3 In most instances, courts have upheld N.L.R.B.
jurisdiction.
Courts have similarly held that enforcement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act [hereinafter F.L.S.A.] places minimal burdens on the
functioning of religious enterprises.
In Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that imposing
wage and record keeping requirements on a religious business
imposed a burden on religious practice or resulted in excessive
entanglement with religion.23 ' Significantly, the Court interpreted the
Act as applying only to the organization's commercial activities, such
that it would not impact its evangelistic activities." Even though the
Alamo Foundation insisted the two functions were intertwined, 6 the
Court still held that "routine and factual inquiries ... bear no
resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court has
previously held to pose a intolerable risk of government
'
entanglement with religion."237
230. See St. Louis ChristianHome, 663 F.2d at 65 (declaring that "the Home's activities
relate only tangentially to the religious mission of the Christian Church.").
231. St. Elizabeth Comm. Hosp., 708 F.2d at 1442 (noting that Board jurisdiction will
produce only incidental intrusion into church affairs and not require continuing
government surveillance).
232. Id.
233. See Kemmerer Vill., 907 F.2d at 662, 664 (70% of funding and a majority of
placements from the state); Denver Post, 732 F.2d 769 at 772 (public funding); St. Louis
ChristianHome, 663 F.2d at 61 (public funds and placements).
234. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985).
235. Id. at 305.
236. Id. at 299.
237. Id. at 305. The Court accepted the district court finding that the business
activities were primarily commercial, but noted that a "admixture of religious motivations
does not alter a business's effect on commerce." Id. at 299.
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The Court's distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities was somewhat misleading, as the Act more broadly refers to
"enterprises" which by definition include nonprofit activities and
entities."' Subsequent lower court decisions have clarified that the
F.L.S.A. applies to nonprofit religious enterprises including religious
schools.239 Even within the parochial school context, courts have held
that enforcement of the Act's wage and reporting requirements
places a limited burden on religious practice and results in minimal
entanglement through potential surveillance and oversight. "
These contexts, if instructive, indicate that application of
employment regulations to religious entities does not necessarily
infringe on their religious decision-making in a way that threatens
religious autonomy or invites excessive government entanglement.
Unlike the Amos holding, which seemed to set aside a category of
"the decision making process in religions" as sacrosanct, other
decisions by the Court and lower courts have been willing to
scrutinize the effect of regulations on free exercise interests. These
decisions indicate that the more outward directed the activity and the
more that an employee is engaged in secular functions or activities,
the less that a regulation affecting employment relationships
interferes with the core values of the Free Exercise Clause, even
though the regulation impacts church decision making.
Section 702 and the Difference of Public Funding
This article has suggested that the constitutional justifications for
expanding the zone of permissible discrimination under section 702 to
include employees engaged in non-religious functions are not
compelling. Congress failed to articulate a convincing rationale for
the need of religious organizations to prefer coreligionists for nonreligious positions, and the Court's rationale for the constitutionality
of section 702-to avoid government interference with the decision
making process of religions24 -is both overbroad and not convincing
While
in the absence of a significant free exercise threat.
See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and § 203(s)(5).
239. See Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 889 F.2d 1389, 1394-95 (4th Cir. 1990);
E.E.O.C. v. Freemont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986).
240. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 889 F.2d at 1398-99; Freemont Christian Sch., 781
F.2d at 1368. Courts have distinguished Catholic Bishop on the ground that Congress
expressly intended private religious schools to be covered under the FLSA. See
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 889 F.2d at 1394 n.7.
241. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987).
238.
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"alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the ability of
religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions" may constitute a sufficient rationale for a legislative
accommodation of religion where the interference falls short of an
actual free exercise violation, there were no legislative findings to
support that such burdens existed under the pre-1972 exemption.
Even if one accepts the Amos rationale for section 702, there is
nothing in the holding that suggests expanding that interpretation
outside the confines of that decision: a privately funded operation of a
non-profit religious entity that is engaging in its own programmatic
activities.
Section 702 should not be interpreted to cover
discrimination of secular employees where the programs or activities
are initiated or funded by the government. In light of the Amos
petitioners' distinction between funded and non-funded activities and
the Court's reference to financial support as crossing the line into
active advancement, funded discriminatory activity cannot be seen as
falling under the already shaky rationale supporting section 702.242
In addition, section 702 should not apply in the context of secular
employees where the employment action places significant burdens
on third persons. As mentioned, the Amos majority viewed the
exemption as chiefly a passive benefit-analogous to the tax
exemption upheld in Walz-that did not enhance the ability of the
religious entity to further its religious mission. 243 This conclusion is
dubious-churches are otherwise subject to Title VII's prohibitions
and the Mormon Church was able to impose its temple recommend
requirement only because Congress had so authorized such action.2"
Section 702 creates an express preference for religious employers,
allowing them to engage in impermissible conduct (i.e., religious
discrimination) that all other employers must forego.
In that
Congress has declared ending employment discrimination to be a
national priority of the "highest order,, 245 it is difficult to view the
failure to exercise regulatory authority as having merely a "hands off"
effect. The Church was able to dismiss Mr. Mayson only because that

242. As discussed, it does not follow that a religious organization loses its coverage
from section 702 merely because it receives some public funding for its activities.
However, section 702 should not apply with respect to those positions or programs directly
funded in whole or in substantial part by the government.
243. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
244. Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
245. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169
(4th Cir. 1985); E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Pub. 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982).
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246

conduct was authorized by federal law.

If one assumes that section 702 extends to programs, activities, or
positions funded in substantial part by the government, then that
interpretation likely violates the Equal Protection and Establishment
Clauses. First, the ability to discriminate on the basis of religion in
publicly funded programs amounts to government-funded
discrimination of a fundamental interest as prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause. Second, section 702 violates the Establishment
Clause by providing a distinct financial and psychological advantage
to religious entities, while it advances their religious mission by
allowing them to capture resources for their adherents and ensure
that their religious message is communicated uninhibited.
Beyond peradventure, the Equal Protection Clause bars
government funded discrimination of a fundamental right such as
race or religion.4 7 In Norwood v. Harrison,the Court held that the
state of Mississippi violated equal protection by providing state-paid
textbooks to private schools that practiced racial discrimination.2'
The rationale was simple. Because the Constitution prohibits the
government from engaging in suspect discrimination, it also prohibits
the government from funding the same discrimination by private
entities: a state could not grant "tangible financial aid [to a private
entity]... if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce,
and support private discrimination., 429 In essence, it was as
unconstitutional for the government to finance private discrimination
as it was for the government to engage in the prohibited acts itself. It
was "axiomatic," the Court held, "that a state may not induce,
encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is
constitutionally forbidden to accomplish."250 The Court correctly
noted that issue of whether the private schools were state actors was
beside the point-here the government was financing the private
discrimination and it was the government's own action that was
246. Amos, 483 U.S. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. See generally the excellent discussion in Alex J. Luchenitser, "Casting Aside the
Constitution: The Trend Toward Government Funding of Religious Social Service
Providers," JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, 615-28 (2002).

248. 413 U.S. 455,471 (1973).
249. Id. at 465-66.
"[T]he Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination." Id.
250. Id. at 465 (citing Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 835
(E.D. La. 1968), affd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968) ("The United States Constitution does not
permit the State to perform acts indirectly through private persons which it is forbidden to
do directly.")).
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unconstitutional. 21 ' Neither did it matter that the aid in question, state
textbooks, did not directly finance the discriminatory activity, such as
with a private school using a state tuition grant to hire only white
teachers. "IT]he Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship
252

between state financial aid [and the private discrimination.]

Although Norwood dealt with racial discrimination, the Court

did not cabin its holding, referring to racial or "other invidious
discrimination." 253 Religious discrimination is as suspect as race for
the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,254 and government

financed religious discrimination is similarly forbidden. There can be
no dispute that the government cannot select its employees on the
basis of religious affiliation or impose any religious test for public
office-holding.255 Similarly, the government cannot facilitate or
encourage prohibited discrimination through financial inducements.2 56

Part of the Court's historic rationale for prohibiting government
funding of religious schools is that many have discriminated on the

basis

of

religion

in

either

employment

or

admissions.

Discriminatory practices have been considered indicia of a
pervasively sectarian environment 28 and have been sufficient in some
instances to block educational institutions from receiving public
251. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469.
252. Id. at 465-66. To be sure, subsequent doctrinal development-see, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring a showing of purposeful
discrimination to trigger the Equal Protection Clause)-may have weakened the broad
pronouncements of Norwood. However, purposeful discrimination may be established
through circumstantial evidence-see Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)-and a state's knowledge that a religious contractor engages in religious
discrimination as authorized by Charitable Choice, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2001), should be
sufficient to trigger the Norwood rule.
253. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467.
254. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
255. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 495-96 (1961); U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 1, cl. 3 (the Religious Test Clause).
256. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (noting that government
responsibility for actions of private parties exists in situations of "significant [government]
encouragement").
257. See N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 636 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 651 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[W]hen a sectarian institution accepts state financial aid it becomes obligated under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to discriminate in admissions
policies and faculty selection.").
258. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 753 n.18, 757 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973).
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aid.25 9

financial
To finance such discriminatory actions would, on its
own, violate the Establishment Clause.6° Here, the Equal Protection
Clause and the Religion Clauses-the Establishment Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause and the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI, cl. 3-"all
speak with one voice... [a]bsent the most unusual circumstances,
one's religion
ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or
2 61
benefits.

The Norwood holding was no sport; the following year the Court
reaffirmed that "any tangible state assistance... is constitutionally
prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, or
support private discrimination. ' '2 62 Members of the Court have
continued to adhere to this principle, with the majority in Richmond
v. J.A. Croson indicating that the government "has a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars... do not serve to finance the
evil of private prejudice. 263
The funding of religious employment discrimination also violates
the commands of the Establishment Clause in several respects.
Recent Establishment Clause decisions have clarified that aid to
religious institutions is unconstitutional if the aid program defines

recipients by reference to religion

64

This most certainly takes place if

the government authorizes private religious contractors to condition
the receipt of a government benefit-here, government funded
employment-on the basis of religious affiliation. On the one hand,
259. See Minn. Fed. of Teachers v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 694, 720 (D. Minn. 1990); Am.
United for Separation of Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872, 892 (D. Ka. 1974).
260. Id. The Norwood Court struggled with the fact that it had upheld some forms of
public aid to parochial schools that in all likelihood engaged in religious hiring
preferences. 413 U.S. at 465. The Court sought to distinguish those cases as involving
either indirect aid or instances where the assistance was "properly confined to the secular
functions of sectarian schools" and did not interfere with "the free exercise rights of
others." Id. at 464 n.7, 468. The Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,upholding
public vouchers for private religious schools, also does not affect this holding, as the Court
emphasized the indirect nature of the benefit broke the circuit of government
responsibility for how the funds were being spent. 122 S.Ct. 2460, 2467 (2002).
261. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Establishment Clause
forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion. In this respect, the
Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may
not segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis of
religion.").
262. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974) (quoting Norwood,
413 U.S. at 466).
263. Richmond v. JA Crosson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
264. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 813
(2000). Accord Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2472.
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permitting a government benefit to be restricted on the basis of
religious affiliation represents preference of one religion over others
and is per se violative of the Establishment Clause.265 A "principle at
the heart of the Establishment Clause" is that the government
2 66
"should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion."
But under Charitable Choice, the government is providing a public
benefit, the ability to discriminate, exclusively to religious providers
while at the same time it is exempting them "from a general
obligation of citizenship:"267 the mandate not to discriminate in
employment. In defining recipients on the basis of religion, the
exemption contravenes the rule that government benefits must be
provided on a religion-neutral basis.2' 6
On the other hand, allowing a religious contractor to condition
the receipt of a job on the basis of religion leads to the other evil the
Court has identified: that defining recipients by reference to religion
"creat[es]
a
financial
incentive
to
undertake
religious
9 Here, section 702 creates incentives for religious
2
6
indoctrination."
organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion with the goal
preserving the purity of their religious message. Allowing religious
organizations to discriminate with public funds empowers those
organizations to act in ways that would be unavailable in the absence
of government funding, providing them with coercive economic
power over their employees.27 ° Publicly funded jobs are a valuable
benefit and, as the Court has noted, there are some occupationssuch as social workers-where the government is the primary source
of employment. 271 Authorizing FBOs to condition employment on
the basis of religion aggrandizes their power by providing jobs for
their adherents while it burdens prospective and actual employees
against whom the exemption is applied.272 Justice Brennan recognized

265. Allegheny County v. UCLA, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
266. Kiryas Joel,512 U.S. at 703.
267. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,221-22 (1972).
268. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 703-05; Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1989); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
269. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.

270. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
See also Brownstein,
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
"ConstitutionalQuestions," at 235.
271. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,77 (1990).
272. See Steven K. Green, "Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory," 57 NYU
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 33, 46-47 (2000); MUTTERPERL, supra note 34, at
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this potential dilemma in his Amos concurrence when he wrote that
the exemption "puts at the disposal of religion the added advantage[]
of economic leverage in the secular realm., 273 It effectively presents
prospective employees with:
the choice of either conforming to certain religious tenets or
losing a job opportunity, a promotion, or... employment itself.
The potential for coercion created by such a provision is in
serious tension with our commitment to individual freedom of
conscience in matters of religious belief...274
The government funded discrimination thus creates incentives for
prospective employees to convert to the religion of the funded
organization, enhancing its religious ministry. Whether this interest is
characterized as a free exercise or establishment concern, it remains
extant: the government is authorizing religious organizations to
administer a public benefit while imposing a religious condition.275
Few results could be further from the principle of neutrality that
prohibits government from affecting the religious choices of
individuals.276
Allowing religious organizations to discriminate in publicly
funded positions violates the Establishment Clause in more
traditional ways. Publicly funding organizations that discriminate
advances religion by allowing FBOs to expand their religious
ministries through hiring of coreligionists and broadcast their
religious messages unimpeded by government restraint. While the
religious organization is prohibited from using public dollars on
religious instruction, worship or indoctrination, the discrimination
exemption ensures that the organization's overall message will remain
canonical and ungarbled.277 This in turn assists FBOs in propagating
their faith and allows them to influence the religious choices and
behavior of program beneficiaries, actions that again are inconsistent
with government neutrality toward religion.278 In addition, the ability
to discriminate in funded positions advances religion in other tangible
423-26.
273. Amos, 483 U.S. at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 340-41.
275. See Martha Minow, "Partners,Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public
and Private, Non-Profit and Profit,and Secular and Religious," 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1088

(2000) ("[I]ndividuals' freedom of religious belief and practice need protection against
government-backed preferences or interference.").
276. See Douglas Laycock, "The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality," 46
Emory L.J. 43, 69-71 (1997).
277. See Green, "Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory," at 48.
278. See Green, "Ambiguity of Neutrality," at 716.
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ways:
It reduces costs, and increases their ability to exercise control
over their members, attract new adherents, fulfill their
normative mission and, perhaps most importantly, maintain
their sense of continuous and distinct identity. The ability to
engage in conduct that satisfies moral requirements and to
perform rituals that demonstrate allegiance to a belief system
or deity without state interference reinforces viewpoints and
demonstrates their force and authority. These rights have
substantial utility for speakers in competition with conflicting
viewpoints. 9
Finally, the fact that an organization discriminates on the basis of
religion may be relevant evidence as to whether an organization is so
pervasively sectarian that it should be constitutionally prohibited
from participating in a government grant program.'
Courts have
rightly surmised that such discriminatory practices are instructive of
whether a religious organization expects its employees in funded
positions to incorporate religious teaching and inculcation in their
services. The inability to separate secular from religious services
should render the FBO ineligible from receiving aid, notwithstanding
arguments that the public funds are not paying for identifiable
worship, instruction or proselytizing."
As a result, in the only case where the constitutionality of
religious discrimination in a publicly funded program was squarely
considered, the court found it unconstitutional. In Dodge v. Salvation
Army, the Army fired an employee in a domestic violence shelter
after discovering she was a Wiccan.'
The Army defended the
employee's suit for wrongful discharge based on section 702. The
court disagreed. Because the position was "made possible by a grant
from the Criminal Justice Department," and "was funded
substantially, if not entirely," from public sources, allowing the Army
to discriminate would violate the Establishment Clause: 3 "the effect
of the government substantially, if not exclusively, funding a position
such as the Victims' Assistance Coordinator and then allowing the
279. Brownstein, "Interpreting the Religion Clauses," at 273-74.
280. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 752 n.18, 757 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973) (internal citations omitted).

281. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Freedom From Religion Found v.
McCallum, 179 F.Supp.2d 950 (W.D. Wisc. 2002).

282. Dodge, 1989 WL 53857.
283. Id. at *2.
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Salvation Army to... maintain the position based on religious
preference clearly has the effect of advancing religion and is
unconstitutional. '2, 4 Although short on analysis, the Dodge court
reached the correct conclusion: allowing the Salvation Army to
condition employment of publicly funded positions on the basis of

religion provided a distinct spiritual advantage to the Army, ensuring
that those beneficiaries who used its services received counseling and
assistance that was consistent with its religious ministry. In addition,
it gave the Army economic leverage in the hiring of future
employees.285
To be sure, violations of the Equal Protection Clause-and, to
lesser extent, the Establishment Clause as well-require a showing of
state action. 86 The "state action" for both clauses is the funding of
the program in which the religious discrimination takes place. 287 Of

course, private entities do not become state actors themselves (and
their discrimination is not automatically attributable to the
government) merely because they receive public funds or perform

284. Id. at *3.
285. Charitable Choice proponents point to several cases where courts allowed
religious organizations to rely on section 702 despite receiving public funding for their
operations. See Hall v. Baptist Mem. Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000);
Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1994), affd 73
F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995); Young v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12248 at *5; Saucier v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 954 P.2d 285, 286 (Wash. App.
1998); Arriaga v. Loma Linda Univ., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 622 (Cal. App. 1992). All of
these cases, however, were decided on statutory grounds and none considered whether the
granting of an exemption violated the Establishment Clause. Moreover, in none of the
cases was it clear that the public funds paid for the position in question.
286. See Michael W. McConnell, "State Action and the Supreme Court's Emerging
Consensus on the Line between Establishment and Private Religious Expression," 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 681, 682 (2001). However, the requirements for government action under the
Equal Protection and Establishment clauses are not the same. In contrast to the equal
protection requirement discussed in the text, the Court has found Establishment Clause
violations in situations where an "appearance" of endorsement of private action exists.
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) ("The Establishment Clause, at
the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief .. "). In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995), a majority of the Justices rejected Justice Scalia's assertion that the
Establishment Clause "applies only to the words and acts of [the] government," id. at 767,
reaffirming that a violation occurs through the government's endorsement of private
religious actions. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
287. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973); see United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The issue [is] not whether government
assistance turns private colleges into state actors, but whether the government itself would
be violating the Constitution by providing state support for single sex colleges.")
(emphasis in original).
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some "public function." 2 8 On rare occasions the Court has found
state action to be present where a private entity performs functions
traditionally reserved to the state. 2" But that standard is quite
stringent," and charitable work performed by churches is not a
function that has been the "exclusive prerogative" of the government
or have been "traditionally associated with [the] sovereign[]." 2 9 ' State
action may be found, however, where the state "significantly
encourages" the conduct of private individuals.292 This rarely occurs
in neutral programs; but Charitable Choice is not neutral in its
allowance of discrimination by FBOs. Here, more than "mere [state]
approval or acquiescence" of discrimination is at work.293 Congress
has expressly exempted FBOs from usual prohibitions on
discrimination in funded programs while it is funding the specific
discriminatory activity.294 The focus, therefore, is not solely on the
funding but also on government authorization, knowledge and
facilitation of the religious discrimination 29 5-that the government has
created a financial incentive to engage in the discrimination, such that
those actions are "fairly attributable to the state," an inquiry that
arises under both the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses.296
Recent Establishment Clause cases have indicated that actions
are not attributable to the state where they involve numerous private
choices arising under a generally available benefits program.2' 9 Thus
where the state awards benefits to a broad class of individuals on the
basis of objective criteria and without respect to their religious
character, such general aid will rarely reflect government preference
288. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
289. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302
(1966).
290. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (the inquiry
being whether the function performed has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State").
291. Id.
292. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457

U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
293. Am. Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (citations omitted).
294. This makes the case stronger than in Norwood v. Harrison, where the funded
activity was not itself discriminatory. 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973)
295. Granted, mere knowledge by the state government is not sufficient for state
action. Am. Mrfs., 526 U.S. at 52.
296. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
809-10 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997).
297. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2467 (2002); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810;
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
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for religion or for the actions taken by that private entity. 9 8 But
grants arising under Charitable Choice programs rarely are "generally
available" to all interested providers; instead, they are typically
awarded through a competitive process utilizing a subjective
assessment of grant applicants' qualifications and proposals and
involving extensive contract negotiating. These contracts typically
include ongoing review of methods and materials used by the private
provider as well as accountability for how funds are used.2" The
government's discretionary and subjective action in selecting and
funding a provider that in turn engages in religious discrimination in
that same program makes those actions attributable to the
government and creates the impression that the government endorses
the discriminatory actions to which its funds are applied. 3°° Moreover,
unlike the statutes in the private choice context, Charitable Choice is
not neutral with respect to religion. It expressly authorizes religious
discrimination by religious organizations alone.
Finally, barring religious organizations from applying section 702
to publicly funded positions-whether based on the Equal Protection
or Establishment Clauses-would not implicate the core concerns
that underlie Amos.
The rationale in Amos for allowing the
expanded exemption was to minimize government interference with
the religious decision-making process by alleviating the burden on
religious organizations of "predict[ing] which of its activities a secular
court [might] consider religious."3 1 This potential chilling effect on
religion is absent, however, with respect to funding of positions under
Charitable Choice which, according to its language, are to engage in
secular functions. Here, unlike the situation that confronted the
Court in Amos, the line is a "bright one," leaving little room for
uncertainty.?°
Because public funds cannot statutorily or
constitutionally pay for "religious worship, instruction or
proselytizing," there should be no ambiguity as in Amos about

298. Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995).
299. See generally Steven Rathgeb Smith & Michael Lipsky, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE:
THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING (1998) (describing the government

contracting process with nonprofit agencies).
300. See Decker v. O'Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 617 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding aid to a
religious school unconstitutional based on the "wide degree of discretion" that the state
had in selecting among "competitive "applicants" for the aid).
301. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327,336 (1987).
302. Id.

Fall 2002]

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

whether the functions are religious or secular. °3 Because FBOs are

on notice that the funded positions are to engage in secular activities,
there should be no chilling effect on the ability of a FBO to define its
mission or distinguish its religious functions from those that are
secular. The threats that loomed in Amos are thus minimized if nonexistent.
Condusion
The provision in Charitable Choice legislation permitting
religious organizations to receive government grants and contracts
but still access the safe harbor of section 702 should be stricken.
There is no evidence that Congress intended section 702 to cover
situations involving public funding, and nothing in the Amos decision
indicates the Court viewed its holding as extending to publicly funded
discrimination. On the contrary, the Amos decision was likely based
on the presumption that section 702 did not extend to publicly funded
employment relationships. If, however, section 702 does apply in
instances where a position is substantially funded by the government,
then its application violates both the Equal Protection and
Establishment Clauses. Both provisions speak with the same voice:
one's religious affiliation "ought not affect one's legal rights or duties
or benefits." 3"

303. See Brownstein, "Constitutional Questions," supra note 223, at 234.
304. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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